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LIABILITY FOR THE "THREAT OF A SALE":
ASSESSING PATENT INFRINGEMENT FOR
OFFERING TO SELL AN INVENTION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ON-SALE PATENTABILITY
BAR AND OTHER FORMS OF INFRINGEMENT
Timothy R. Holbrook*
I. INTRODUCTION
The company Las-R Printers decides to market a newly
designed laser printer. After it begins to advertise but before
completing any sales, Las-R discovers that its new printer is
covered by a competitor's patent. Realizing that the potential
liability could be staggering, the company withdraws the printer
from the market and believes it is now safe from the threat of an
infringement suit. Before 1994, that may have been the case.
Now, however, Las-R Printers may still be liable for
infringement because Congress changed the patent law such
that merely offering to sell an invention is a form of
infringement.'
Congress added this form of infringement to comport with
international standards.2 These attempts are nothing new-the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute
of Technology. J.D., Yale Law School; B.S., North Carolina State University.
Former law clerk to the Honorable Glenn L. Archer, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. The author wishes to thank Graeme Dinwoodie, Cynthia Ho,
Janice Mueller, Christopher Leslie, Paul Carter, M.D., and participants at the Second
Annual IP Scholars Conference at Cardozo Law School for their comments and
suggestions.
1. See infta notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
2. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong. (1994), Pub. L.
No. 103-465, § 101(d)(15), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 [hereinafter URAA] (approving
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). See also
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreements Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1208
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (granting the exclusive right to prevent third parties from
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international community has worked toward harmonizing
international intellectual property laws since the nineteenth
century.3 The past few decades, however, saw renewed efforts
at harmonization.4 The "most significant"5 and the "most
ambitious" 6 of these efforts has been the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),7 which
provides a minimal level of protection for intellectual property
protection for all signatories to the agreement.8 With respect to
changes in U.S. patent law, TRIPS has resulted in the
consideration of foreign inventive activities in assessing who is
the "first to invent," and thus entitled to the patent;9 the
publication of patent applications after eighteen months;10 and
the change of the patent term from seventeen years from the
date that the patent issued to the period between issuance and
twenty years from the application date. 1
TRIPS also added offers to sell an invention as a form of
patent infringement.12 Prior to TRIPS, a party could infringe a
"offering for sale" a product or process).
3. See generally Adam Isaac Hasson, Domestic Implementation of International
Obligations: The Quest for World Patent Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
373 (2002).
4. See generally John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002).
5. See id. at 688.
6. See generally John E. Guist, Noncompliance with TRIPS by Developed and
Developing Countries: Is TRIPS Working?, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 69 (1997).
7. See TRIPS, supra note 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1197.
8. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 696.
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (g)(1) (2003); 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2003). The United States
decides who is entitled to a patent by assessing who was the first to invent the new
device, process, or compound. See Anneliese M. Seifert, Will the United States Take
the Plunge into Global Patent Law Harmonization? A Discussion of the United States'
Past, Present, and Future Harmonization Efforts, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173,
177 (2002). Previously, only activity occurring within the United States could be
used to demonstrate that a person was the first inventor; activities outside of the
United States did not count. See id. The United States is alone in determining
inventorship by a "first-to-invent" system; the rest of the world determines affords
inventorship status to the first person to file a patent application with the patent
office. See id. at 198.
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2003). See also Seifert, supra note 9, at 190. Before the
change, patent applications were confidential. See id. The contents of the
application only became public if the patent actually issued. See id.
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2003). See also Seifert, supra note 9, at 185.
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003). The amendment also added "importation" of
a patented device as a form of infringement. See id. Congress amended the statute
in 1994, but the statute did not become effective until January 1, 1996. See Black &
Decker, Inc. v. Home Product Mktg., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 n.17 (N.D. Ill.
1996). "Offer to sell" language was also added to 35 U.S.C. § 252 to add intervening
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patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) only by making, using, or selling
a patented invention without the permission of the patent
owner.13 Whereas previously "a threat of a sale [did] not
constitute an act of infringement," 14 now a party who simply
offers to sell a device covered by a patent is liable as an infringer,
even if the sale is never completed.' 5 In adopting this new form
of infringement, however, Congress provided virtually no
guidance as to its meaning.16 In contrast to the original forms of
infringementmaking, using, or selling the patented inventionthe
new version has unique problems in defining its scope. For
there to be infringement, there must be an "offer," not merely
the creation, utilization, or completed sale of the infringing
good.17 Before the addition of an offer to sell as a form of
infringement, the primary concern was whether the accused
device was covered by the claims of the patent.'8 The "offer to
sell" form of infringement adds an additional requirement in
assessing infringement: whether an offer has been made.
Moreover, in contrast to making or usingwherein the device
accused of infringing necessarily exists, which facilitates the
infringement analysisthe new form of infringement arguably
could apply when the device has yet to be built. Is infringement
permissible, then, for a device subject to an offer to sell before it
has been put into physical form? What implication does this
rights to "offer to sell" in light of a reissued patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2003);
Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003). Section 271 has other forms of infringement,
but § 271(a) delineates the traditional, basic forms of infringement. See id.
14. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 915 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003). Congress amended the statute in 1994, but it
did not become effective until January 1, 1996. See Black & Decker, 929 F. Supp. at
1120 n.17 (N.D. Ill. 1996). "Offer to sell" language was also added to 35 U.S.C. § 252
to add intervening rights to "offer to sell" in light of a reissued patent. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 252 (2003); Shockley, 248 F.3d at 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
16. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1250 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("Unfortunately, other than stating that an 'offer to sell' includes only those
offers 'in which the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of the patent,'
Congress offered no other guidance as to the meaning of the phrase.") (citation
omitted).
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
18. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc) ("An infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court determines
the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then the properly
construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device.") (citations
omitted). See also id. at 1459 ("An accused device that does not literally infringe a
claim may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if each limitation of the
claim is met in the accused device either literally or equivalently.").
2003]
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possibility have for infringement generally, particularly for
selling a device?
Neither courts nor commentators have written about this
new version of infringement.19 The courts have begun to wrestle
with some of these issues, but much of the analysis is
underdeveloped or just plain erroneous.20 No other articles have
performed a rigorous analysis to determine the proper standard
for the offer to sell. This article attempts to fill the glaring gaps
regarding "offer to sell" infringement. Further, the article
proposes a novel framework involving an economic analysis of
offers to sell in assessing what harm this new form of
infringement is intended to redress.
Part I examines the history of 35 U.S.C. § 271 and what is
considered to be infringement of a patent.21 The various forms
of infringement have expanded over the past fifty years, with
the most recent amendment being the addition of "offer to sell"
infringement. The evolution of the forms of infringement
suggests that Congress has an expansive view of what
constitutes infringement and is interested in increasing the
strength and scope of U.S. patents.22
Part III assesses what the proper standard for an "offer"
should be under this new provision.23 After reviewing the
19. See, e.g., 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("Little interpretation of this change as it relates to direct infringement under
§ 271(a) has been given .... ); Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2002 WL
31443128, at *3 (N.D. Il1. Oct. 30, 2002) (observing "Federal Circuit case law defining
'offer to sell' under § 271 is still developing"); Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source
Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("As a result, 'offer to sell'
has received relatively little interpretation in the courts, and is not helpfully defined
in the statute or in its legislative history."); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34
F. Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D. S.C. 1999) ("There is scant case law available interpreting
what constitutes an 'offer to sell' as it appears in the amended form of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a)."). See also Joan E. Beckner, Patent Infringement by Component Export:
Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp. and the Extraterritorial Effect of U.S. Patent
Law, 39 Hous. L. REV. 803, 823 (2001) ("[T]he law surrounding an 'offer to sell' an
invention without an actual or contemplated infringing sale remains unsettled.").
Moreover, the author could find only three articles that deal with the issue
of the proper scope for offers to sell at any length. See Thomas L. Irving and Stacy
D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention and Infringement After GATT/TRIPS, 22 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 309, 312 (1994); Edwin D. Garlepp, An Analysis of the
Patentee's New Exclusive Right to "Offer to Sell", 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
315 (1999); Robert Ryan Morishita, Patent Infringement After GATT: VIat Is an Offer
to Sell?, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 905.
20. See infra notes 161-96 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 31-81 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 31-81 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 83-283 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43
PATENT INFRINGEMENT
current case law on this issue as determined by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,24 Part III considers three sources
of authority to assess the appropriate standard for "offer to sell"
infringement. First, infringement for "offers to sell" is compared
and contrasted with the statutory proscription of obtaining a
patent on a device that has been "on sale" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). 25 The comparison between being "on sale" and being
"offered for sale" is appropriate because the concepts are similar
and because district courts rely on § 102(b) precedent for
guidance in interpreting the "offer to sell" provision of § 271.26
Second, because § 271(a) was amended to harmonize U.S. law
with international law, Part III also compares interpretations of
offers to sell and sales in foreign jurisdictions, specifically the
United Kingdom and Canada. Third, Part III analyzes the
economic consequences of an infringing offer to sell to
determine whether the Federal Circuit's standard for an "offer to
sell" adequately redresses the pecuniary harm to the patentee
caused by this infringing activity. After evaluating these
sources, Part III concludes that a general commercialization
standard would best effectuate the objectives of both the "on-
sale bar" and "offer to sell" infringement.
Part IV then addresses whether a complete, physical
embodiment of an invention should be required for an
infringing "offer to sell." 27  Historically, for there to be
infringement, the allegedly infringing device had to be in a
physically complete form.28  Merely constructing the
components of a device, without actually building the
completed device, was not sufficient for infringement.29 Part IV
24. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has national jurisdiction
over patent cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
the Federal Circuit for cases from the district court's if the district court's
jurisdiction was based "in whole or in part" on the parts of 28 U.S.C. § 1338 relating
to patent law). The Supreme Court recently altered the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction so that only cases in which the complaint states a patent cause of action
will go to the Federal Circuit. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002). Cases in which a patent claim is raised only as a
counterclaim will go to the regional circuits. See id.
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003).
26. See, e.g., Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., Nos. 98-7164-CIV, 98-7057-CIV,
2002 WL 459889, at *13 n.5 (S.D. Fla. March 14, 2002).
27. See infra notes 291-393 and accompanying text.
28. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972) (citing




suggests that the addition of "offer to sell" as a form of
infringement challenges this norm, not only for offers to sell but
also for completed sales of a patented device. While a
requirement that the invention be in its complete and assembled
form is appropriate in determining whether an infringer has
"made," "used," or "imported" an invention, such a standard is
inappropriate for sales of, and offers to sell, an infringing device.
Instead, drawings or models should be sufficient for offers to sell
and actual sales, so long as a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would be able to read such drawings and readily
build the device.
Part V summarizes the conclusions reached in this article. 30
The addition of this new form of infringement provides the
courts with the opportunity not only to establish the legal
criteria for "offers to sell" but also to reconsider the standards
for both the "on-sale bar" and for infringement generally. The
policies underlying the "on-sale bar" and infringement for offers
to sell will be more fully realized with a broader
"commercialization" standard, in which any attempt to
commercialize the device would be invalidating, if performed
more than a year before the patent application is filed, and
infringing, if performed during the patent term. Similarly,
infringement for an offer to sell makes little sense if the
requirement for a physical embodiment of the device remains.
Consequently, the courts should bifurcate infringement via
offers to sell and for actual sales from those of making, using, or
importing the invention. The former should only require an
enabling disclosure for there to be infringement, while the latter
would retain the requirement for a complete, tangible item. This
standard will best protect the property interests of the inventor.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271
The categories of infringing activities have been dynamic
since the Patent Act was adopted in 1952. An understanding of
the historical development of infringement by both the courts
and Congress is crucial in ascertaining the appropriate scope for
infringement by an "offer to sell."
30. See infra notes 394-400 and accompanying text.
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A. The Patent Act's Definition of Infringement
Congress intended to codify the common law in the Patent
Act.31 Included in the Patent Act was § 271, which prescribed
what constituted infringement of a patent.32 Specifically, the
statute stated that "whoever without authority makes, uses, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States infringes
the patent."33  The statute reflected the territorial nature of
patent rights: all infringing activities had to occur within the
United States.34 Congress made no revisions to § 271 for over
thirty years, leaving the development of infringement law to the
courts.
B. Interpretation by the Supreme Court-Deepsouth Packing Co.
v. Laitram Corp.35
The need for judicial interpretation of § 271 readily became
apparent. One glaring oversight was a definition for "patented
invention." The statute did not address whether manufacture of
all of the components of an invention-without actually
assembling the components into the device as claimed in the
patent-would constitute infringement.3 6 For example, would
merely manufacturing the parts of a patented mousetrap
infringe, or would there only be infringement once the
mousetrap was actually assembled? The statute did not detail
the extent to which the infringing device had to be in its
completed form as contemplated by the patent claims. It is this
31. See Aro Mfg.v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 350 n.2
(1961) (Black, J., concurring) (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 9323 (July 4,1952)).
32. See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 811 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271).
33. Id. See also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972)
(noting that the Patent Act defined direct infringement as occurring when an
infringer makes, uses, or sells the patented product). The original Patent Act also
included limitations with respect to contributory infringement and inducement to
infringe, as well as limitations on those forms of infringement. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b)-(d).
34. See id.
35. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir.
1966).
If anything is settled in the patent law, it is that a combination patent
covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that no element,
separately viewed, is within the grant. We deem it equally clear that
unassembled elements of a combination patent do not constitute the
"patented invention."
See id. (citation omitted).
20031
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precise question that the Supreme Court addressed in Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.37
The two patents in Deepsouth related to shrimp deveining
machines. 38 Deepsouth, the accused infringer, did not practice
the invention in the United States, instead it sought "to make the
parts of deveining machines, to sell them to foreign buyers, and
to have the buyers assemble the parts and use the machines
abroad." 39 The Court, therefore, confronted a situation in which
an infringing machine had not been made, used, or sold in the
United States, instead, the disassembled components of a
machine that would infringe if constructed in the United States
were exported and later assembled overseas.40 The Court noted
that "[t]he statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement to
make or use a patented product outside of the United States."41
The key question was whether Deepsouth had sold the
invention in the United States.42 The Court concluded that
Deepsouth's activity did not constitute a sale in the United
States and was thus non-infringing.43 In reaching this decision,
the Court framed the issue as follows:
[Laitram's] argument that Deepsouth sells the machines...
cannot carry the day unless it can be shown that Deepsouth
is selling the 'patented invention.' The sales question thus
resolves itself into the question of manufacture: did
Deepsouth 'make' (and then sell) something cognizable
under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it
'make' (and then sell) something that fell short of
infringement?44
The Supreme Court agreed with the latter: Deepsouth made
(and then sold) something that fell short of infringement.45
37. See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524-25.
38. See id. at 519-20.
39. Id. at 523.
40. See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524 ("The company contends that by this means
both the 'making' and the 'use' of the machines occur abroad and Laitram's lawful
monopoly over the making and use of the machines throughout the United States is
not infringed."). Infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) is limited to activities "in
the United States." See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Thus assembly of the device overseas
would not be infringement under the law at the time. See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524.
41. Id. at 527.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 532.
44. Id. at 527.
45. See id. at 529.
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Relying on a Second Circuit Court of Appeals case,46 the Court
reasoned that a patentee's "monopoly does not cover the
manufacture or sale of separate elements capable of being, but
never actually, associated to form the invention." 47 In the
Court's view, for there to be infringement for selling the
invention, the entire device must have been completely
assembled in the United States.48
In supporting its position, the Court recognized "this
Nation's historical antipathy to monopoly." 49 As a result of this
hostility towards patents, the court noted that "'the limitations
on [a patent's] exercise are equally strictly enforced."' 50 The
Court "would require a clear and certain signal from Congress
before approving the position of a litigant who... argues that
the [scope of patent protection] is wider, and the area of public
use narrower, than courts had previously thought."51
The Court narrowly construed the patent statute in the
absence of clear congressional intent.52 Arguably inappropriate,
however, was the Court's conflation of the terms "make" and
"sell" from the patent statute. The Court, by phrasing the
question of whether the infringer "did... 'make' (and then
sell)"53 suggests that the making of the invention is a necessary
prerequisite to selling the invention. This reading of the statute
seemingly vitiates the "sale" form of infringement because, for
there to be a sale, the person selling the device would have
infringed already under the "make" provision.5 4 This reading
violates the canon of statutory construction that "courts should
46. See Radio Corp. v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935). The dissenters in
Deepsouth criticize the majority's characterization of this as a leading case espousing
the "prevailing law." See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 533 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 529 (quoting Radio Corp., 79 F.2d at 628).
48. See id. See also id. at 533 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Here everything was
accomplished in this country except putting the pieces together as directed (an
operation that, as Deepsouth represented to its Brazilian prospect, would take 'less
than one hour') .... .
49. Id. at 530.
50. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 230 (1964)).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 527.
54. Cf. Richard A. Leavitt, The "Selling" of Patented Goods: In Search of a
Definition, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1903, 1915 (1992) ("Adopting this 'contract for sale'
definition would leave the right to exclude others from domestic selling of the
patented invention a mere subset of the right to exclude others from making the
invention.").
2003]
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disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language
superfluous."55
C. Congress Intercedes to Mitigate (or Eviscerate?) Deepsouth
The impact of Deepsouth, however, was only temporarily felt
as Congress supplied the requested "clear and certain signal" by
statutorily overruling Deepsouth's key holding in 1984.56
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's overture in 1984 by
amending § 271 in two significant ways.5 7 First, Congress
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984,58 which added § 271(e).59 Section 271(e) established
that it is not infringement to make, use, sell, or import the
invention "solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products." 60 Submitting an application to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval to market a drug,
however, is a form of infringement according to the statute.61
In 1984, Congress also adopted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which
closed the "export the components/assemble abroad"
loophole. 62 Section 271(f) provides:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of a
55. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
56. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. (1984), Pub.
L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 [hereinafter H.R. 6286] (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(0 (2003)). See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(0.
57. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
58. S. 1538, 98th Cong. (1984), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2003)). This act was also known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act. See id.
59. See id.
60. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2003).
62. See H.R. 6286, supra note 56 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(0
(2003)). See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2).
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patented invention that is especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in
whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.63
Congress effectively overruled Deepsouth when Congress
made it an act of infringement to export either the complete but
disassembled invention, or even a component of an invention for
which there is no noninfringing use.64 In doing so, Congress
actually significantly expanded the patentee's exclusive rights.65
But § 271(f) only deals with the export aspect of Deepsouth; the
requirement for a complete device remains the controlling law
for infringement for making or selling a patented invention
under § 271(a).66 The link between making and selling remains
intact, inappropriately rendering the selling language
superfluous under the present law.
D. Further Amendments Expand Infringement
Congress subsequently amended § 271 in 1988, 1992, and
1994 to provide more exclusive rights to patentees. 67 The 1988
amendments included clarifications to § 271(e)68 and added
63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2).
64. See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(noting "Congress' effective overruling of Deepsouth in 1984, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)").
65. See H.R. 6286, supra note 56 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2)
(2003)). See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2) (2003).
66. See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("[Tihe analysis of Deepsouth controls in this case. Because Porta Systems tested
within the United States only components without patent protection, Deepsouth
dictates that Porta Systems has not infringed... under § 271(a)."); Rotec Indus., Inc.
v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252-53 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Hence, as to claims
brought under § 271(a), Deepsouth remains good law: one may not be held liable
under § 271(a) for 'making' or 'selling' less than a complete invention."). See also
Dwyer Murphy, Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corporation:
Increased Protection Against Making and Using Combination Patents, 34 AM. U. L. REV.
761, 766 (1985).
67. See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
68. See Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1988, S. 2483,
100th Cong. (1988), Pub. L. No. 100-670, § 201(i)(3), 102 Stat. 3971, 3988 (1988). This
amendment clarified that biotechnological inventions were not subject to the
provisions of § 271(e). See id.
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§ 2 71(g).69 Section 2 71(g) is similar to § 271(f) in that it closes a
loophole in the statute resulting from the territorial nature of the
patent rights. Specifically, § 2 71(g) defines an infringer as
anyone who
without authority imports into the United States or sells or
uses within the United States a product which is made by a
process patented in the United States shall be liable as an
infringer, if the importation, sale, or use of the product
occurs during the term of such process patent.70
Prior to the adoption of § 271(g), a competitor could
circumvent a U.S. patent only if it covered the process of making
the product, but not the product itself.71 Technically, in order to
infringe the patent under § 271(a), a competitor would have to
perform the process within the United States.72 If the process
was used overseas, there would be no infringement.73 A
competitor could avoid infringement, therefore, by
manufacturing the chemical via the patented process outside of
the United States and then importing the unpatented product.74
Section 2 71(g) is Congress's response to this problem and an
attempt to reach some extraterritorial conduct-the use of the
infringing process-through the domestic nexus of importation
and domestic sale or use.75
69. See Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, H.R. 4848, 100th Cong. (1988),
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1564.
70. See id. For example, a chemical company may have discovered a more cost
effective process to make an already known chemical. The process could be
patented, but the chemical compound itself may not be.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1127-28
(D.C. Cir. 1981) ("A sale of a product made by a patented process does not itself
infringe the patent; it is the unauthorized use of the process that infringes the
patent.").
72. See Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 535 U.S. 1109 (2002) ("The
congressional reports make clear that the principal purpose of the statute was to
prevent a patent owner's competitors from avoiding the patent by producing
products outside the United States and then importing them.").
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., S. Res. 1543, 99th Cong., 132 CONG REC. S17386 (1986)
A significant loophole in our patent laws, as compared with those of our
major trading partners, has emerged as a major factor in the dynamics of
global innovation and economic competition. In contrast to Japan and
nearly all of the Western European nations, the United States does not
provide patent protection against the importation, and subsequent use or
sale, of products made abroad without authorization using a process
patented in the United States.
75. A product avoids infringement if it has been "materially changed by
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In 1992, Congress passed the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act,76 which added § 271(h).77
The Act clarified that state sovereign immunity to a patent
infringement suit is abrogated by federal patent law.78 The
Supreme Court subsequently invalidated this provision as
unconstitutional. 79
Finally, in 1994, Congress amended § 271(a), (c), (e), and (f)
to include "offers to sell" and "importation" of an invention, and
added § 271(i) in order to meet our obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement to harmonize United States intellectual property
laws with international patent laws.80 These changes were made
with little discussion and, as such, there is no legislative history
to inform the metes and bounds of this new form of
infringement. Section 271(i) limits infringement via offers to sell
by noting that "[als used in this section, an 'offer for sale' or an
'offer to sell' by a person other than the patentee, or any
designee of the patentee, is that in which the sale will occur
before the expiration of the term of the patent."81
subsequent processes" or "it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of
another product." 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(1)-(2) (2003).
76. Pub. L. No. 102-560, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 430.
77. See id.
78. The Federal Circuit had concluded that the patent statute lacked the
required demonstration of Congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity.
See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
79. See generally Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
80. See URAA, supra note 2 (codified as amended at 35 U.S. § 271(i) (2003)).
81. 35 U.S.C. §271(i) (2003). Congress has also offered no guidance in
interpreting this provision. See id. This section requires that, for there to be an
infringing offer to sell, the sale contemplated by the offer must be consummated
during the term of the patent. See id. This provision begs the question-how does
one determine the date of consummation for the offer to sell? If a patentee must
wait and see if the infringing sale is consummated during the patent term, then the
impact of the addition of "offers to sell" in § 271(a) would be minimal. See Lifting
Techs., Inc. v. Dixon Indus., Inc., No. CV-96-98-MOCCL, 1996 WL 653391, at *3 (D.
Mont. Aug. 27, 1996) (rejecting argument that "offer to sell" infringement is limited
"to those instances in which an actual sale occurs before expiration of the patent-in-
suit" because then "the amendment to the statute would have effected no change").
The burden of proving infringement lies with the patentee. See, e.g.,
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2001) ("To prevail, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the accused device infringes one or more claims of the patent either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents."). The burden, however, should fall
on the patentee to demonstrate that the intended sale is to be completed during the
patent term.
Placing the burden on the patentee creates some obvious problems. The
accused infringer would clearly be in the best position to know when the
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The history of § 271 demonstrates that, contrary to the
Supreme Court's historical antipathy to patents, Congress has
taken an expansive view of them, enlarging the class of activities
covered by the patent statute's forms of infringement.82
Consequently, a more expansive view of infringement in the
courts is appropriate in light of Congress' continued efforts to
place more subject matter under § 271.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN "OFFER" UNDER
SECTION 271-LESSONS FROM THE ON-SALE BAR, HARMONIZATION,
AND ECONOMICS
The body of law regarding what constitutes an infringing
"offer for sale" remains relatively undeveloped. 83 Subpart A
reviews the development of the law as it now stands in the
Federal Circuit.84 Given its obvious similarity to the "on-sale
bar," subpart B compares the law of the "on-sale bar" to the law
for "offer to sell" infringement to determine whether the
standards of the "on-sale bar" can provide insight as to the
appropriate test for "offers to sell." 85 Next, because part of the
purpose underlying adoption of "offer to sell" infringement was
contemplated sale is to occur, and the accused infringer likely would not make
definite statements as to the date of completion. As such, the best solution to this
difficulty is a rebuttable presumption: absent a clear expression of a date outside of
the patent term in the actual offer to sell, the courts should presume that the
contemplated sale will occur during the patent term unless the accused infringer
can come forward with evidence to demonstrate that the sale will occur post-
expiration. If the accused infringer can make such a showing, then the presumption
fails. The court would then weigh the evidence to see whether the patentee has
satisfied her burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.
This rebuttable presumption would thus help facilitate disclosure of such
information by the accused infringer, who is the party in the best position to have
knowledge of and access to information regarding the contemplated sales date.
82. See supra notes 56-81 and accompanying text. Compare Deepsouth Packing
Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) ("To the degree that the inventor
needs protection in markets other than those of this country, the wording of 35
U.S.C. §§ 154 and 271 reveals a congressional intent to have him seek it abroad
through patents secured in countries where his goods are being used.") with
Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("[Tihe statute was intended to grant patent holders the same protection against
overseas infringers as they already enjoyed against domestic entities.").
83. The Federal Circuit has clarified a few ambiguities. See, e.g., 3D Sys., Inc. v.
Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the
determination of what constitutes an offer for sale is a matter of federal law, not
state contract law); Hollyanne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting that a mere offer to donate does not constitute an offer for sale).
84. See infra notes 90-129 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 130-203 and accompanying text.
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to harmonize United States patent law with the international
standard, subpart C considers international interpretations of
the most closely corresponding provisions in the United
Kingdom and Canada.86 Subpart D considers the harm that may
accrue to a patent holder by an infringing offer to sell and
concludes that the current legal standard fails to redress the
injury to the patentee. 87 Weighing all of these considerations,
subpart E concludes that the present requirement for a formal
commercial offer for both the "on-sale bar" and "offer to sell"
infringement is inappropriate. 88 Instead, the courts should use a
broader "commercialization" standard, which could ensnare
activities such as advertising.
A. The Federal Circuit's Development of the "Offer to Sell"
Standard-What Is an "Offer" Under § 2 71(a)?
The threshold question when assessing infringement via an
"offer to sell" is what exactly constitutes an "offer." 89 The
statute itself provides no guidance; the legislative history is also
void of assistance. The development of the law has been left to
the traditional, common law approach.
Several cases in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
have discussed the "offer to sell" type of infringement. The first
cases arose in contests over personal jurisdiction. In 3D Systems,
Inc., v. Aarotech Laboratories, Inc.,90 the Federal Circuit addressed
whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted over a defendant
based solely on an infringing offer to sell. 91 Recognizing that
this case was one of first impression, the court rejected the
argument that state law should govern whether or not there has
been an offer. 92 Instead, the court concluded that it would apply
federal common law in making this assessment in order to
promote uniformity.93 The court held that there was personal
86. See infra notes 204-27 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 228-64 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 279-88 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (discussing possible definitions of "offer to sell" to satisfy personal
jurisdiction requirements); Lifting Techs., Inc. v. Dixon Indus., Inc., No. CV-96-98-
MOCCL, 1996 WL 653391, at *3 (D. Mont. Aug. 27, 1996) (relying on on-sale bar
precedent of what constitutes an "offer" to interpret § 271(a)).
90. 160 F.3d at 1373.
91. See id. at 1378.
92. See id. at 1378.
93. See id. at 1379.
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jurisdiction, based on price quotation letters being sent to
persons in the relevant state:
The price quotation letters sent by Aaroflex to California
residents state on their face that they are purportedly not
offers, but to treat them as anything other than offers to sell
would be to exalt form over substance.... As a matter of
federal statutory construction, the price quotation letters can
be regarded as "offer[s] to sell" under § 271 based on the
substance conveyed in the letters, i.e., a description of the
allegedly infringing merchandise and the price at which it
can be purchased. 94
Since 3D Systems dealt solely with the question of personal
jurisdiction, the court did not discuss in detail the requirements
for finding liability for offers to sell.95
The Federal Circuit further elaborated on the requirements
to establish personal jurisdiction by infringing offers to sell in
Hollyanne Corp. v. TFT, Inc.96 In Hollyanne, the court focused on
"whether an offer to donate is the equivalent of an offer to
sell." 97  The court concluded that an offer to donate is
insufficient to constitute an offer to sell.98 Personal jurisdiction,
therefore, was lacking.99  The court expressly reserved the
question of "whether or under what circumstances actual
advertisements of a product are sufficient to be considered an
'offer to sell."' 100
This question did not remain unanswered for long.
Discussing the standard for "offers to sell" on the merits in Rotec
Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,101  the Federal Circuit
concluded that formal commercial offers to sell are required for
infringement under § 271(a). 102 In Rotec, the court confronted the
possible offer to sell a crane and conveyor systems to carry
concrete long distances to the People's Republic of China. 0 3 The
district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement
94. Id. Accord Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2002 WL 31443128, at
*4 (N.D. I11. Oct. 30, 2002) (holding that brochures containing description and price
sufficient for personal jurisdiction).
95. See 3D Systems, 160 F.3d at 1378.
96. 199 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 1308.
98. See id. at 1309.
99. See id. at 1310.
100. Id. at 1309 n.6.
101. 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
102. See id. at 1255-56.
103. See id. at 1249.
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under § 271(a)'s "offer to sell" provision.1 4 Addressing "offers
to sell" for the first time on the merits and not merely as a matter
of personal jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit "define[d] § 271(a)'s
'offer to sell' liability according to the norms of traditional
contractual analysis."105 The court further determined that the
meaning of "'offer to sell' is to be interpreted according to its
ordinary meaning in contract law, as revealed by traditional
sources of authority" 10 6 such as the Uniform Commercial Code
and dictionaries,'0 7 as well as the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. 08
After discussing the appropriate legal standard, the Federal
Circuit addressed the merits of the case.10 9 In support of its
argument that the defendant made infringing offers, the
patentee offered the following evidence:
(1) the offering parties met nine times in the United States
about supplying a conveyor system for the Three Gorges
Dam Project; (2) Johnson and Tucker designed and priced the
contemplated system in the United States; and (3) the written
offer identified Johnson as the supplier for the concrete
system, and confirmed that Johnson had provided all
relevant technical and financial documents." 0
The court concluded that the patentee failed to show infringing
offers to sell because "[n]one of [the] evidence ... establishes any
communication by Defendants with any third party.""'
Without communication to a third party, there could be no
commercial detriment to the patentee." 2  The court also
104. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 810, 817 (C.D. Ill.
1998).
105. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
106. Id. at 1255. Ironically, by requiring an actual commercial offer, the Federal
Circuit-contrary to the only purpose for adopting offer to sell infringement-has
disharmonized United States law from the international community, where the
"offer to sell" analog has been determined to include advertisements. See infra
notes 211-24 and accompanying text.
107. See id. at 1255 (comparing interpretation of § 271(a) with interpretation of
the term "sale or importation" under the Tariff Act of 1930 in Enercon v. ITC, 151
F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in which the court referenced both the UCC and
dictionaries).
108. See id. at 1257, 1255 n.5.
109. See id. at 1250.
110. See id. at 1255.
111. Id.
112. See id. ("In the absence of a communication with a third party, it is difficult
to imagine any commercial detriment of the rightful patentee taking place.").
2003]
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concluded that further evidence of negotiations was insufficient
because proof of agency of one representative was lacking 13 and
the deposition testimony offered lacked the requisite proof "'of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited
and will conclude it."'114 As a result, the court affirmed the
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement. 115
Later cases have further clarified the "offer to sell" language
of § 271(a). For example, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp.,116
the court addressed an offer to sell in the context of a patent that
claimed a method, as opposed to a device or a compound. 117
The court looked at the law addressing the infringing sales of
patented methods and noted that "'[t]he law is unequivocal that
the sale of equipment to perform a process is not a sale of the
process within the meaning of [§] 271(a)."'18 Similarly, the court
concluded that "a mere offer to sell a machine... cannot serve
as the sole basis for finding infringement of the claimed
method."11 9
The court has also looked at the extent to which the addition
of "offer to sell" language has affected the defense of intervening
rights that apply to reissued patents.120 A patentee can seek
reissuance of an already-granted patent if the patent holder
113. See id. at 1256. Without proof that the agent had contracting authority, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court correctly excluded the evidence as
inadmissible hearsay. See id.
114. Id. at 1257 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)).
115. See id. at 1258. In her concurrence, Judge Newman disagreed with the
reasoning of the majority. See id. (Newman, J., concurring). In her opinion, the case
should have been decided on the ground that the offer to sell did not contemplate a
"sale" that would occur within the United States. See id. Relying on § 271(i), Judge
Newman concluded that not only must the offer be made in the United States, but
the sale contemplated in that offer also must take place within the United States.
See id. An offer made in the United States to sell a device in Australia, for example,
would not infringe. See id. The majority avoided the issue of what the
contemplated sale must cover, leaving the question unanswered. See id. The
district courts that have addressed this issue have adopted Judge Newman's
perspective. See, e.g., Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp.
2d 1152, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings
Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 613, 624-25 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
116. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
117. See id. at 1349.
118. Id. at 1349 (quoting Joy Techs. Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
119. Id.
120. See Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1359-61 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See also
35 U.S.C. § 252 (2003) (establishing the defense of intervening rights).
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believes the original patent is inoperative, invalid, or has
claimed more or less than the patent holder had the right to
claim.121 If the patent holder made these errors without any
intent to deceive the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), then
the PTO will reissue the patent again as corrected. 122 Because
the scope of a patent's claims can change as a result of reissue,
competitors who may have relied upon the original patent in
order to design around or otherwise compete with the patentee
may have concerns as to the scope of the patent and their
potential liability. The reissued patent could now cover
activities that the original patent did not, which could unfairly
ensnare a competitor who was not infringing the original patent,
but who may now infringe the reissued patent.123
To combat this inequity, 35 U.S.C. § 252 2 provides for
"intervening rights," which act as a limited defense to patent
infringement.124 There are two forms of intervening rights:
absolute and equitable.125  Absolute intervening rights are
absolute in the sense that the patentee has no recourse under the
Patent Act and the court must grant the infringer relief.126
Section 252 also affords equitable intervening rights. 27 A court
may allow the infringer to continue performing an infringing
process or to continue to manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sell
articles either made before reissue or for which the potential
121. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2003).
122. See id.
123. See 4 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 15.05[2]-[3]. See also Sontag
Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1940).
[T]he patentee might have included in the application for the original
patent, claims broad enough to embrace petitioner's accused machine, but
did not. This "gave the public to understand" that whatever was not
claimed "did not come within his patent and might rightfully be made by
anyone." The enlarged claims were presented with knowledge of the
accused machine and definite purpose to include it.
Recapture within two years of what a patentee dedicates to the public
through omission is permissible under specified conditions, but not, we
think, "at the expense of innocent parties."
Id.
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 2 (2003). Although the concepts are fairly
straightforward, the statutory language of § 252 is complex and difficult to follow.
See id. This paragraph summarizes the relevant legal considerations for the
granting of intervening rights. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
125. See BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
126. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 2 (2003). See also BIC, 1 F.3d at 1220.
127. See 35 U.S.C. § 252 2.
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infringer made substantial preparations prior to reissue. 128
Prior to the adoption of "offer to sell" infringement,
intervening rights applied only to products already made at the
date the patent reissued. 29 In Shockley v. Arcan, Inc.,130 the
infringer argued that absolute intervening rights should apply to
an offer for sale for which there are only "price quote letters that
contain a description of the infringing materials without regard
to whether those offers covered products already
manufactured."131 The court rejected this contention by stating
that "regardless of whether Arcan's December 1997 price quote
was an offer for sale to Sam's, the 10,000 Z-Creepers at issue had
not been manufactured before the '732 reissuance. Absolute
intervening rights therefore do not protect Arcan's importation
and sale of its Z-Creepers." 132 The Federal Circuit clarified that,
for absolute intervening rights to apply, the infringing good
must have been manufactured prior to the reissue date. 33 In
other words, "the 'offer to sell' language... has not changed the
statutory requirement that absolute intervening rights apply
only to existing products."134
As these cases demonstrate, the Federal Circuit has
provided some much-needed guidance with respect to "offers to
sell." The contours of this form of infringement, however,
remain ill-defined. The cases have not clearly addressed what
constitutes an infringing "offer" or the extent to which the
accused device must be in a physical form to infringe.
B. The Implications of the "On-Sale Bar" of§ 102(b) for "Offer to
Sell" Infringement
The adoption of "offer to sell" infringement provided a
number of court challenges due to the dearth of Congressional
guidance on the matter. Although the Federal Circuit has
128. 35 U.S.C. § 252 2 (2003). See also Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349,
1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that it is within the court's discretion to apply
equitable intervening rights).
129. See BIC, 1 F.3d at 1221.
130. 248 F.3d at 1349.
131. Id. at1360.
132. Id. The court also affirmed the denial of equitable intervening rights
because the infringer was found to willfully infringe. See id. at 1361. Because the
infringer had unclean hands in equity, the Federal Circuit found no abuse of
discretion by the district court in denying equitable intervening rights. See id.




started to define the contours of this form of infringement, the
district courts were the first to struggle with "offers to sell." The
logical place for the district courts to have turned was the "on-
sale bar" of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).135 This statutory provision
provides a limitation on the ability of an inventor to obtain a
patent.136 If the invention was on sale in the United States more
than one year prior to the date the inventor files her patent
application, then she is precluded from obtaining a patent.137
Given the "on-sale" language in the statute and the judicial gloss
on this provision, § 102(b) provides a natural beginning point for
the district courts to analyze the new form of infringement
under § 271(a).
The history of the interaction of the "on-sale bar" and "offer
to sell" infringement, although short, is already rather patched
and convoluted. This subpart reviews recent parallel
developments in "on-sale bar" jurisprudence, the Federal
Circuit's original rejection, and its subsequent reversal of its
position regarding the use of the "on-sale bar" as persuasive
authority with respect to "offers to sell."
1. The Current State of the "On-Sale Bar"Jurisprudence
The "on-sale bar" is a statutorily-based limitation on the
patentability of an invention. 138 Specifically, a patent cannot be
obtained if the "invention was... on sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States." 139 Four policy considerations underlie the
"on-sale bar" to patentability: (1) the policy against removal of
inventions from the public that the public has come to view as
freely available due to the prolonged sales activity; (2) the policy
in favor of prompt and widespread disclosure of new inventions
to the public; 140 (3) the policy against allowing inventors to
135. See, e.g., Lifting Techs., Inc. v. Dixon Indus., Inc., No. CV-96-98-MOCCL,
1996 WL 653391, at *3 (D. Mont. Aug. 27, 1996) (relying on on-sale bar precedent to
interpret § 271(a)).
136. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003).
137. See id.
138. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003).
139. Id. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More
They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for
Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 941-55 (2000) (discussing
the history and development of on-sale bar jurisprudence).
140. This policy is promoted by the on-sale bar in that once commercial activity




exploit commercially the exclusivity afforded by the patent
beyond the statutorily prescribed period (currently twenty years
from the application date); and (4) the policy in favor of
affording the inventor a reasonable amount of time (one year
from the date of the commercial activity) to determine whether
the patent is a worthwhile investment.141
The Supreme Court recently addressed the "on-sale bar." In
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,142 the Court articulated a two-part test
for applying the "on-sale bar": (1) the invention must be subject
to a commercial offer for sale and (2) the invention must be
"ready for patenting" or developed to a point when it would be
appropriate to file a patent application.143  According to the
court, whether an invention is ready for patenting can be
demonstrated
in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice before
the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the
inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the
invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person
skilled in the art to practice the invention.1 44
Because an inventor can obtain a "paper patent," the Court
reasoned that there is not any reason an "invention" cannot be
on sale prior to its construction. 145
141. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See
also Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (noting that the on-sale bar provides "a balance of the policies of allowing the
inventor a reasonable amount of time to ascertain the commercial value of an
invention, while requiring prompt entry into the patent system after sales activity
has begun") (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).
142. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
143. See id. at 67.
144. Id. at 67-68. "Reduction to practice" is a term of art in patent law that
basically means that the inventor has constructed a functional version of the
invention. See UMC Elecs., 816 F.2d at 652 ("Under our precedent there cannot be a
reduction to practice of the invention here without a physical embodiment which
includes all limitations of the claim."); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Actual reduction to practice requires that
the claimed invention work for its intended purpose.") (citation omitted). A
reduction to practice does not require that the constructed version be commercially
viable. See Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731
F.2d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[C]ommercial marketability is not a requirement of
reduction to practice.").
145. A "paper patent" is a patent on an invention that has never actually been
constructed. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 61-63 (discussing The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1(1988). In The Telephone Cases, the Supreme Court upheld Alexander Graham Bell's
patent on the telephone as valid even though he filed his application before ever
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After Pfaff, the Federal Circuit began to redefine the "on-
sale" bar in Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,146 which held
that a formal commercial offer for sale is required to satisfy the
first part of the Pfaff test.147 The court was concerned with the
uncertainty attending "some more amorphous test" and
therefore aspired to bring "greater certainty" to this area of the
law. 148 The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Pfaff, which established the "ready for patenting" test, to
determine whether the "on-sale bar" applied.149 In Pfaff, the
Supreme Court noted that the invention must be "ready for
patenting" and the subject of a "commercial offer for sale." 150
Relying on this latter language, the Group One court decided that
the use of the "commercial offer" language suggested that the
Supreme Court intended that only offers in the contract sense
could trigger the bar.151
In so holding, the court rejected the language in RCA
Corporation v. Data General Corporation152 that the "on-sale bar"
may arise "by a patentee's commercial activity which does not
rise to the level of a formal 'offer' under contract law
principles." 153 According to the Federal Circuit in Group One,
this language was "unnecessary to the decision" and "non-
binding dictum."154  Instead, a formal commercial offer,
governed by general principles of contract law such as those
articulated in the UCC, governs the "on-sale bar."155
Ironically, after writing off the language in RCA as dicta, the
Federal Circuit relied on dicta in Pfaff regarding commercial
offers for sale.15 6 Whether the Supreme Court truly intended to
constructing a working telephone. See id.
146. 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
147. See id. at 1047.
148. See id. at 1047-48.
149. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67. See generally Holbrook, supra note 139 (discussing
the Pfaff"ready for patenting test").
150. See id.
151. See Group One, 254 F.3d at 104647.
152. 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
153. Id. at 1062.
154. Group One, 254 F.3d at 1046.
155. See id. at 1047. The UCC is one tool that can be used in determining these
general contract principles; other sources include treatises and the Restatement
(Second) on Contracts. See infra note 201.
156. The Federal Circuit freely acknowledged Pfaff s dicta:
Though the Court did not elaborate on what was meant by "a commercial
offer for sale"-the issue not being directly presented-the language used
strongly suggests that the offer must meet the level of an offer for sale in
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adopt a strict "commercial offer" criterion is unclear. 157 In Pfaff,
the Supreme Court noted that certainty would not be a problem
for an inventor because "[a]n inventor can both understand and
control the timing of the first commercial marketing of his
invention." 158 Instead of adopting a strict requirement for a
formal offer, the Supreme Court may have considered
commercial marketing, such as advertising, to be sufficient.
Group One seems to continue a recent trend in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence of relying upon ambiguous language in Supreme
Court opinions to create binding, new precedent, regardless of
the context of the language in the Supreme Court's decision.159
the contract sense, one that would be understood as such in the
commercial community. Such a reading leaves no room for "activity which
does not rise to the level of a formal 'offer' under contract law principles."
Group One, 254 F.3d at 1046-47 (emphasis in original).
157. Cf. Peter D. Sabido, Group One, Ltd. V. Hallmark Cards, Inc.: The § 102(b)
On-Sale Bar Bright-Line Test of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. Just Got Brighter, 6 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 583, 595 (2002) ("[T]he Supreme Court in Pfaff did not
overrule Federal Circuit law by a 'strong suggestion' that a commercial offer under
contract law is required for a [§] 102(b) offer for sale.").
158. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998) (emphasis added). ("[Wle
perceive no reason why unmanageable uncertainty should attend a rule that
measures the application of the on-sale bar of § 102(b) against the date when an
invention that is ready for patenting is first marketed commercially.") (emphasis
added).
159. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,
1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (using the language of Markman v. Westview Instruments,
517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), to support deference to trial court's claim construction).
The referenced language, however, dealt with the relationship of judge versus jury
in construing a patent claim. See id. The overall opinion concludes that claim
construction is legal without factual components. See id. The Federal Circuit sat en
banc to abrogate this line of authority. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Similarly, in Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Company, 234 F.3d 558, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), the court adopted a
"complete bar" for prosecution history estoppel. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc)
vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (drawing on the language in Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997), noting that failure to rebut
the presumption of prosecution history estoppel "would bar the application of the
doctrine of equivalents as to that element"). The "complete bar" was first
articulated by Judge Gajarsa in his dissent to the rehearing en banc of Litton
Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. See 145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court reversed the "complete bar" and reinstated the
flexible rule. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234
U.S. 558 (2002).
While not actually changing the law, Judge Rader has suggested in a
concurrence that the "experimental use" defense has been eliminated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson, even though the viability of such
defense was never at issue in Warner-Jenkinson. See Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g
Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) ("The Supreme
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In any event, the Federal Circuit has strictly adhered to this new
standard in subsequent cases. 160
The parallel between these two provisions would appear
obvious-offering an invention for sale is a form of infringement,
whereas placing an invention on sale more than one year prior
to filing the patent application renders the patent invalid. While
the similarities between the two sections may be apparent, the
Federal Circuit, in its early "offer to sell" jurisprudence,
dismissed any reliance on "on-sale bar" law to interpret
infringement concerning offers to sell.161 The court reasoned
that:
The policy reasons underlying the on-sale prohibition of
§ 102(b) include the concern that patentees will
commercialize their inventions while deferring the beginning
of the statutory patent term, encouraging prompt and
widespread disclosure of inventions to the public,
discouraging the removal of inventions from the public
domain when the public has come to rely on their ready
availability, and giving investors a reasonable period to
discern the potential value of the invention. These policy
reasons have no resonance with § 271(a)'s statement of the
rights of the patentee to exclude others from making, using,
offering to sell, or selling the patented invention. Thus,
"offer to sell" under § 271 cannot be treated as equivalent to
"on sale" under § 102(b).162
Court's recent reiteration [in Warner-Jenkinson] that infringement does not depend
on the intent underlying the allegedly infringing conduct, to my eyes, precludes
any further experimental use defense, even in the extraordinarily narrow form
[previously] recognized."). This contention has been expressly rejected by a
subsequent panel of the Federal Circuit. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The use of ambiguous language to change, in some cases dramatically, the
law would seem to waste judicial resources as all of these attempts (save PfafJ) have
been reversed. More importantly, these sea-changes can risk upsetting the
expectations of patentees, given the retrospective effect of such changes. See Festo,
122 S. Ct. at 1841 ("The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson,
which instructed that courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt
the settled expectations of the inventing community .... Fundamental alterations
in these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their
property.").
160. See, e.g., Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1048 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
161. See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("We decline to import the authority construing the 'on sale' bar of
§ 102(b) .... ").
162. Id. (citation omitted).
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Notwithstanding this rejection of the use of "on-sale bar"
jurisprudence, "offer to sell" infringement and the "on-sale bar"
are now coextensive with respect to what constitutes an offer-a
commercial offer as defined by general contract law.163 The
Federal Circuit also has disavowed its earlier refusal to apply
"on-sale bar" methodology to § 271(a), at least with respect to
what constitutes an offer. 164 In Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Corp., the court recognized that the panel in 3D Systems had
rejected the importation of "on-sale bar" methodology into
§ 271(a), 165 but noted that "the analysis of an 'offer to sell' under
§ 271(a) is consistent with the [Supreme] Court's analysis in Pfaff
of § 102(b)."166
District courts have subsequently used the "on-sale bar"
cases and offer to sell cases interchangeably in addressing the
issue of what constitutes an "offer."167 With respect to what
constitutes an "offer to sell," the Federal Circuit has made§ 271(a) coextensive with the "on-sale bar" of § 102(b) by
requiring a formal commercial offer for both.168 The court has
made clear that general contract law principles developed under
federal common law, and not an individual state's contract law,
are to be used to determine what constitutes an offer. 169 A
163. See supra notes146-55 and accompanying text.
164. See Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., Nos. 98-7164-CIV, 98-7057-CIV, 2002
WL 459889, at *13 n.5 (S.D. Fla. March 14, 2002) ("Yet a more recent Federal Circuit
decision disagrees with 3D Sys. and holds that 'the analysis of an 'offer to sell'
under § 271(a) is consistent with the Court's analysis in Pfaff of § 102(b). I agree
with Rotec on this point and will look to guidance from cases interpreting § 271 as
well.") (citation omitted).
165. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("Similarly, the court rejected the argument that it might look to 'on-sale bar'
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).").
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Elan, 2002 WL 459889 at *16 (citing 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379, an
offer to sell infringement case, for support of its on-sale bar analysis).
168. See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-55
This analysis [of § 102(b)] is not divergent from our § 271(a) analysis,
because an offer for sale, whether made before or after a patent is applied
for, or after it is granted, requires no more than a commercial offer for sale.
Both sections invoke the traditional contractual analysis. Therefore, we
similarly define § 271(a)'s "offer to sell" liability according to the norms of
traditional contractual analysis.
Id.
169. See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998)("[T]he tort of patent infringement due to an 'offer to sell' is a federal statutory
creation which is not limited by California contract law."). If state contract law
governed whether an invention had been offered for sale, then the federal statutory
tort of infringement would vary from state to state, destroying national uniformity
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description of the goods, plus a price, at a minimum is required
to constitute an offer.170
2. Comparing and Contrasting the Policies Underlying the
"On-Sale Bar" and "Offer to Sell Infringement"-Is it
Appropriate to Treat the Two the Same?
The Federal Circuit initially rejected using the "on-sale bar"
and offer to sell infringement interchangeably.' 7 ' Subsequently,
the Federal Court has retreated from this position. 72 Whether or
not these two doctrines should be coextensive, however,
warrants further investigation.
The Federal Circuit originally opined that, because the
policies underlying the two provisions differed, they should not
be treated the same.1 73 The Federal Circuit was correct in that
the two provisions do implicate different policy considerations.
The "on-sale bar" is concerned with attempts by the patentees to
commercialize their inventions prematurely, remove inventions
that are in the public domain due to sales activity, encouraging
prompt disclosure of inventions to the public, and giving
inventors time to assess the commercial viability of their
inventions.174 "Offer to sell" infringement, in contrast, deals
with a third party violating the inventor's exclusive rights.
These reasons, as articulated by the Federal Circuit to
distinguish these provisions, 75 are entirely unsatisfying because,
in economic terms, the provisions are the same.
in the treatment of the patent. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1379 n.4.
172. See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-55.
173. See 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379 n.4.
174. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
175. The Federal Circuit specifically reasoned:
We decline to import the authority construing the "on sale" bar of § 102(b)
into the "offer to sell" provision of § 271(a). The policy reasons underlying
the on-sale prohibition of § 102(b) include the concern that patentees will
commercialize their inventions while deferring the beginning of the
statutory patent term, encouraging prompt and widespread disclosure of
inventions to the public, discouraging the removal of inventions from the
public domain when the public has come to rely on their ready
availability, and giving investors a reasonable period to discern the
potential value of an invention. These policy reasons have no resonance
with § 271(a)'s statement of the rights of the patentee to exclude others
from making, using, offering to sell, or selling the patented invention.
Thus, "offer to sell" under § 271(a) cannot be treated as equivalent to "on
sale" under § 102(b).
3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379 n.4 (citation omitted).
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The purpose of "offer to sell" infringement is to prevent
attempts by infringers to exploit the invention in contravention
of the patentee's exclusive rights.176 This protection is to allow
the patentee to recoup the costs of developing the invention. 177
Similarly, the "overriding concern" 178 of the "on-sale bar" is to
prevent inventors from commercially exploiting the invention
beyond the patent term.1 79 The "on-sale bar" prevents the
patentee from extracting the value of the patent prior to actually
receiving the patent, mitigated by the one-year grace period.
The economics underlying the two provisions are the same.180
The value that the patentee extracts from the patent pre-term is
the same value that an infringer inappropriately extracts during
the patent term-the commercial value of the invention.18
Consequently, the policies identified by the Federal Circuit are
an improper basis upon which to justify treating "offers to sell"
and the "on-sale bar" differently. 8 2
The policies identified by the court are not the only ones
implicated by "offers to sell" infringement and the "on-sale bar."
In determining whether interpreting these doctrines
coextensively is appropriate, the nature of the "on-sale bar" and
"offer to sell" infringement should be considered. Specifically,
"offer to sell" is an infringement provision concerned with
providing protection to a patentee.8 3 In contrast, the "on-sale
bar," is a prior art provision concerned with preventing patents
176. See id.
177. See Holbrook, supra note 139, at 944.
178. Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("The overriding concern of the on-sale bar is an inventor's attempt to
commercialize his invention beyond the statutory term.") (citing STX, LLC v. Brine,
Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
179. See UMC Elecs., Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
180. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[5][g], at 25-33 n.33
(Cumulative Supp. 2001); Garlepp, supra note 19 at 323.
181. See id. ("A key policy consideration underlying the on sale bar-to prevent
an inventor from commercializing the invention for more than a year before filing a
patent application-closely resembles the policy underlying a patentee's statutory
right to exclude unauthorized sales and offers to sell: to prevent others from
deriving commercial advantage from the invention without compensating the
patent owner.").
182. Cf. id. at 23 (Cumulative Supp. 2001) ("To the extent that policy analysis
enter into the analysis, it would seem that a patentee ought to have a remedy
against (but only against) any unauthorized commercialization of his or her
patented invention that is as specific and definite as the commercialization that
would have started the Section 102(b) clock for filing a patent application.").
183. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
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for inventions that are already in the public domain.184 The
following subparts explore this distinction and consider the
appropriate legal standards for both the "on-sale bar" and "offer
to sell" infringement in light of the policies that underlie each.
a. Section 271(a) Is an Infringement Provision, Concerned
with Harm to the Patentee
In all the arguments made for and against treating offers to
sell on the "on-sale bar" the same, one basic argument has been
overlooked-statutory interpretation. The language of the two
provisions is different. Arguably, each could be construed to
have a different scope. The term "offer to sell" is narrower than
"on sale." The use of the term "offer" implicates the concept of
the contract term. The latter, however, is silent as to offers.
Prompted by the Pfaff dicta, the Federal Circuit adopted the
limitation of a formal commercial offer, but previous case law
shows that this is not the only interpretation.185 The "on-sale
bar" reasonably could be construed to include more than formal
offers, such as advertisements and other mere invitations for
offers. 8 6
Further consideration of the purposes of these provisions
suggests an initial pause in treating them as coextensive. "Offer
to sell" is an infringement provision and is concerned solely
with appropriation of the inventor's device. An overly broad
definition of offer to sell infringement could have a chilling
effect on competitors, particularly attempts to design around the
patent. If something short of a commercial offer could constitute
infringement, a competitor's ability to assess the marketability of
a device would be limited and would risk earlier exposure to an
infringement suit. This increased risk of litigation would at least
marginally discourage competitors from entering the market
because they would be impeded from assessing the true value of
their respective products.
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would
exacerbate this problem because modifications made to a
product to avoid the patent may not be sufficient to avoid
liability. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a party whose
device avoids the literal scope of a patent claim may still be
184. See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26.
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liable as an infringer if the differences between her device and
the patent claim are insubstantial. 8 7 As a result, even if the
competitor modified her device to avoid the patent, she could
still be drawn into a lawsuit on the basis of a marketability study
on a device that is not different enough from the invention
claimed in the patent to avoid the doctrine of equivalents.
Consequently, the risk of chilling appropriate and beneficial
behavior (i.e., design arounds) counsels against an expansive
interpretation of what constitutes an offer to sell.
b. The "On-Sale Bar" Is a Prior Art Provision--Severe
Problems with Present Federal Circuit Jurisprudence
Under § 102(b)
The "on-sale bar" is a prior art provision188 that defines
what information is considered to be in the public domain with
respect to assessing whether an invention is novel 8 9 or
nonobvious.190  An essential aspect of the "on-sale bar" is
whether the invention should be considered in the public
domain as a result of the commercial activity of the inventor.191
Advertisements-generally viewed as invitations for offers and
not formal offers themselves'92-could transmit the relevant
information about the invention to the public as easily as a
formal commercial offer. 93  Sales brochures and similar
information could easily provide a description of the device that
is sufficient to place the invention within the public's grasp. A
formal offer would not be required. The primary question
should be whether the invention is in the public domain, not
whether there has been a formal commercial offer. In addition,
many commercial offers may be less in the public domain
because they are more likely to be party-to-party negotiations
and not mere advertising. Both the language and the differing
187. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17,
39-40 (1997).
188. See Holbrook, supra note 139, at 963-64.
189. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003).
190. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003). Novelty and nonobviousness are the basic
requirements for patentability. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2003).
191. See Holbrook, supra note 139, at 965.
192. See Elan Corp., 2002 WL 459889, at *15 (citing WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 4:7 (4th ed. 1990)).
193. Whether a formal commercial offer or merely an invitation for offers, the
activity would still have to satisfy the "ready for patenting" standard under Pfaff.
See Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
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purposes of the "on-sale bar" and offer to sell infringement 94
counsel that they should be treated differently, with the "on-sale
bar" being given a broader definition, encompassing a wider
range of activity.
In fact, a crafty inventor could avoid the requirement that
the invention reach the level of a commercial offer to sell. As
advertisements are invitations to solicit offers or to enter into a
bargain, a patentee could advertise the invention. Then, if a
potential consumer offered to buy the invention, and the
inventor declined, technically there still has been no offer to sell,
but merely an offer to buy the invention. Despite clear attempts
to commercialize the device, the relevant patent claims would
not be invalid under a strict reading of the Federal Circuit's "on-
sale bar" test. A patentee thus would be free to advertise for a
considerable length of time beyond the one year grace period
with impunity because, by definition, there would be no offer to
sell and only offers to buy or to negotiate. 195 This hypertechnical
view shows that the current test is far too narrow if the
overriding concern of the "on-sale bar" is an inventor's attempt
to commercialize the invention beyond the statutory term.
The Federal Circuit adopted the "commercial offer"
standard in the interest of promoting predictability for
application of the "on-sale bar,"196 and likely the "offer to sell"
doctrine as well. Such certainty may be more elusive than the
court believes. District courts have struggled with what exactly
constitutes a commercial offer. 197 The UCC does not define
"offer" explicitly. 198 Moreover, as the Federal Circuit explained,
194. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
195. One commentator has identified a number of commercial activities that a
patentee could take without transgressing the bar of § 102(b), such as sending
samples, advertising, or distributing price lists without order forms. See Sabido,
supra note 157, at 604-05. The invention could easily be within the grasp of the
public at this point, and failure to invalidate the patent would undermine the role
of the on-sale bar as a prior art provision. See id.
196. See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
197. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. The insurance industry has
also struggled with this issue. See generally David A. Gauntlett, "Offer for Sale"
Patent Infringement Lawsuits: New Opportunities for Insurance Coverage, New
Controversies, 54 SMU L. REV. 1919 (2001). The issue has arisen as to whether
infringement for an offer to sell an invention is an "advertising" injury under
various insurance policies. See id.
198. SeeJeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d. 49, 67 (D. Conn.
2001); Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-51, 2002 WL 1307333, at *12
(D. Del. June 14, 2002); Elan, 2002 WL 459889 at *13 (quoting 1 James J. White &
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the UCC
is a model code.., and no body of case law has explored its
provisions. Instead, it has been enacted with modifications in
the several states. Thus, the body of case law from which we
must draw guidance under Group One is that of the state and
federal courts interpreting their individual versions of the
UCC. From this body of state law, we will search for the
common denominator for assistance in crafting the federal
common law of contract that now governs the on-sale bar.199
The courts are expected to scour all of those sources of law for
guidance.
In addition to all of the relevant state and federal common
law, courts are "forced to resort to extra-Code contract law via
[§] 1-103 to determine whether a party has made an offer." 200
The courts have turned to a myriad of secondary sources for
guidance in assessing whether a party's activities constitute a
commercial offer for sale. 20 1 Given this wide variety of sources
that must be combed to ascertain what constitutes an offer, ex
ante predictability for inventors who are trying to decide when
they need to file their patent application is likely a dream. If
trained lawyers must resort to a host of materials to assess
whether there has been an offer, assuming that a technologist
untrained in the law could do the same is absurd. Determining
whether activities constitute a formal commercial offer is a
rather complex analysis and thus does not foster predictability
or certainty in either area of the law.20 2
Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-4 (4th ed. 1995)); Finnsugar
Bioproducts, Inc v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., No. 97 C 8746, 2002 WL 460812 at *5 (N.D.
Ill. March 26, 2002). See also Sabido, supra note 157, at 596 ("[The U.C.C.] does not
provide any guidance on what the terms 'offer' or 'offer for sale' mean .... Thus, a
court determining whether the alleged infringer has demonstrated the offer for sale
prong [of the Pfaff test] will not find the U.C.C. very helpful.").
199. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
200. Elan, 2002 WL 459889 at *13 (quoting 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-4 (th ed. 1995)).
201. Secondary sources that the courts have used include the UCC,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON CONTRACTS, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, FARNSWORTH
ON CONTRACTS, and ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. See Linear,
275 F.3d at 1050; Jeneric/Pentron, 171 F. Supp. 2d. at 67-68; Fisher-Price, Inc. v.
Safety 1st, Inc., No. Civ.A.01-51, 2002 WL 1307333, at *12; Finnsugar, 2002 WL
460812, at *5-*6.
202. What constitutes a sale-let alone an "offer for sale"-is far from definite and
demonstrates the considerable uncertainty that attends the "commercial offer"
approach for § 271(a) and § 102(b). Under the generic formula of "general contract
principles," there are a variety of standards. For example, a contract may not
require delivery for there to be a sale, but a contract may require delivery for the
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Additionally, from the perspective of certainty, a broader
interpretation of the "on-sale bar" may in fact enhance certainty.
Citing the Supreme Court's goal in Pfaff to "bring greater
certainty to the analysis of the on-sale bar,"203 the Federal Circuit
reasoned that applying contract principles would better achieve
this objective because:
"[c]ourts are quite accustomed to and comfortable with
determining whether a particular communication or series of
communications amounts to an offer in the contract sense,
and that type of determination is well established in law. In
contrast, the dictum test suggested in RCA, under which
something less than a formal commercial offer could still be
an offer for purposes of the on-sale bar, opens up a vast sea
of uncertainty, and requires a whole new mode of analysis,
one whose parameters remain ill-defined.204
Aside from the fact that the parameters of what constitutes a
"commercial offer" also remain ill-defined, 205 the court adopted
the wrong perspective from which we should judge certainty.
The Federal Circuit is concerned explicitly with the courts. But
predictability in a validity contest should be concerned with the
inventor. The Supreme Court's interest in enhancing certainty
was for the benefit of inventors, not judges-" [p]etitioner correctly
argues that these provisions identify an interest in providing
inventors with a definite standard for determining when a
patent application must be filed." 206 Most inventors likely do
not have the ability to discern what constitutes a "formal"
commercial offer because they may be unable to assess properly
whether their commercial activity would be invalidating.
As a result, a general rule on "commercialization" would
sale to be complete. See Leavitt, supra note 54, at 1913-14 (comparing the definitions
of "contract" and "contract of sale" in Black's Law Dictionary). The UCC, to which
the Federal Circuit has referred in developing its on-sale bar and offer to sell
infringement jurisprudence, also is not clear either. In fact, the UCC seems to
suggest that in order for there to be a commercial sale, the object under
consideration must already exist. See U.C.C. § 2-401(2); Leavitt, supra note 54, at
1917-18 (noting that the UCC sets as the default rule that there must be "physical
delivery of the goods" for title to pass). But see infra notes 317-54 and accompanying
text (rejecting a requirement for a physical embodiment of the invention for there to
be a sale under § 271(a)).
203. Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
206. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998).
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provide a broader category of proscribed activity. Any
commercialization activities-such as advertisements or sales
brochures-would invalidate the patent. Given this broader rule,
if there is any doubt by the inventor, then he or she should file
the patent. Perhaps a broader commercialization standard
would ensure that the patentee errs on the side of caution
instead of nearing the fuzzy line of what constitutes a formal
"offer." The inventor thus would be on notice if any steps are
taken to commercialize the invention.207 This standard would
also avoid the potential abuse of commercial offers previously
identified, wherein a patentee could assess the commercial value
of a patent beyond the grace period by technically never offering
the invention for sale but only inviting offer through
advertisement.20 8
C. Harmonization of U.S. Patent Law-Lessons to Be Learned from
Abroad
Another, and often neglected, source for insight as to what
constitutes an "offer" under offer to sell infringement is the
international community. The only reason that this form of
infringement was added to the United States law was to
harmonize it with the rest of the world under the TRIPS
Agreement.2 9 Consideration of how foreign jurisdictions have
applied their form of "offer to sell" infringement is appropriate.
This subpart discusses the law as it relates to offers to sell, or
their closest analogs, in Canada and the United Kingdom. 210
1. United Kingdom-"Offers to Dispose"
In the United Kingdom, the Patents Act of 1977 defines
infringement in section 60. Specifically, the Act states:
Section 60. Meaning of infringement.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person infringes
207. But see Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d. 533, 546 (N.D. Tex.
2002) ("From a public policy perspective, setting a premature date when the
inventor should apply for a patent by finding an ambiguous circumstance to
constitute a commercial offer for sale would tend to diminish clarity."). The
concern expressed by the district court with setting a premature date, however,
seems misplaced. See id. That concern is mitigated by the requirement that the
invention be ready for patenting. See id.
208. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.




a patent for an invention if, but only if, while the patent is in
force, he does any of the following things in the United
Kingdom in relation to the invention without the consent of
the proprietor of the patent, that is to say-
(a) where the invention is a product, he makes, disposes
of, offers to dispose of, uses or imports the product or
keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise;
(c) where the invention is a process, he disposes of, offers
to dispose of, uses or imports any product obtained
directly by means of that process or keeps any such
product whether for disposal or otherwise. 211
The United Kingdom's Patents Court recognized that the "offer
to dispose" language has the same interpretation "as the
corresponding provisions of the European Patent Convention
(EPC), the Community Patent Convention (CPC), and the Patent
Co-operation Treaty (PCT)."' 212 This section is also concerned
with harmonization, such as the United States' "offers to sell."
"Practically speaking.., one can go directly to the
corresponding treaty provision and construe that. Our
provision will have the same meaning .... No one has ever
found a departure from the corresponding Treaty provision." 213
In Gerber Garment Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems Ltd.,214 the
Patents Court in the United Kingdom addressed the meaning of
"offer to dispose." 215 The issue was whether an advertisement
alone would constitute an offer to dispose of the invention.216
The accused infringer in Gerber made advertisements two years
prior to the first sale of the infringing device.217 The patentee
asserted that it was entitled to damages due to the price
depression that such offers created.218 The infringer argued the
211. Patents Act of 1977, vol. 37, pt. I, § 60 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
212. Menashe Bus. Mercantile Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2002 R.P.C. 47, 952
(2000).
213. Id.
214. 1995 R.P.C. 383 (2000).
215. See id. The Federal Circuit discussed this case but rejected its holding. See
Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Of
course, we must ultimately decide this issue as a matter of United States law.").
216. See Gerber, 1995 R.P.C. at 411.
217. See id.
218. See id. See also infra notes 238-78 and accompanying text (analyzing the
economic effect an infringing offer may have depending on market conditions).
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distinction between an "offer" and an "invitation to treat." 219 An
offer is "an indication of terms of an contract by which the
offeror will consider himself bound if the terms are accepted.
Anything short of that, in pre-contractual negotiations or an
advertisement, will not do." 220 In the words of the Federal
Circuit, the infringer was arguing that there must be a
commercial offer for there to be infringement.221
The Patents Court, however, rejected this argument.222
Section 60 "is derived from Article 25 of the Community Patent
Convention," which grants the patentee the right to prevent
unauthorized third parties "from making, offering, putting on
the market, or using a product which is the subject matter of the
patent."223 Relying on this language, the court concluded that
"offer to dispose" is broader in scope than contractual offers:
A party who approaches potential customers individually or
by advertisement saying he is willing to supply a machine,
terms to be agreed, is offering it or putting it on the market.
If that is to happen during the life of the patent he infringes.
He is disturbing the patentee's monopoly which he ought not
to do. So I think the early advertisements were
infringements, not mere threats. 224
The United Kingdom has construed "offer to dispose" as
including more than formal commercial offers, in contrast to the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of "offers to sell" to be strictly
limited to formal commercial offers. Contrary to the goal of
adopting "offers to sell" an invention as infringement, the
Federal Circuit has now "un-harmonized" our patent law on the
international level.
2. Canada-" Vending" of an Invention
Canadian courts have also discussed whether infringing
activities falling short of actual commercial offers constitute
infringement. The state of the law, however, is less certain in
Canada than in the United Kingdom. Presently, Canadian law
grants the patentee "the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of
219. See Gerber, 1995 R.P C. at 411.
220. See id.
221. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1246 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
222. See Gerber, 1995 R.P.C. at 411-12.
223. See id. at 411-12 (quoting Article 25 of the CPC).
224. See id. at 412.
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making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to
others to be used." 225 As a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement,
Canadian law should proscribe offers to sell an invention as
well, or some other comparable language. Nothing in the
current Canadian statute seems to meet this requirement.
Moreover, Canadian courts have not addressed the issue of
whether acts that fall short of a completed sale should constitute
infringement under the present Canadian law. In light of these
absences, consideration of the prior Canadian Patent Act may
provide insight into whether Canadian courts will consider acts
that fall short of actual sales as infringing activity.
Section 46 of the 1970 Patent Act in Canada afforded the
patentee "the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making,
constructing, using and vending to others to be used the said
invention." 226 In Domco Industries Ltd. v. Mannington Mills Inc.,
227
all of the sales were in the United States.228 The patentee argued,
however, that the accused infringer's activities in Canada
amounted to an infringing "vending" of the invention.
229
According to the patentee, "'vending' goes beyond actual sales
and covers the promotion of sales of the product in Canada."
230
The Canadian Federal Appeal Court, however, rejected this
argument and concluded that "vending has the same meaning
as selling." 231  The Appeal Court upheld the trial court's
conclusion:
What the evidence demonstrates, at most, is that the
defendant Mannington offered in Canada, for sale in the
United States, the infringing floor covering. These were
"paper offers" insofar as activities within Canadian
jurisdiction are concerned as the defendant did not have
possession of the infringing materials in Canada.... In my
view this cannot amount to offering for sale in Canada as the
sale was to take place in the United States, and if it is offering
in Canada for sale elsewhere that activity does not per se
amount to infringement in Canada.232
The Canadian court refused to interpret the patent laws to
225. 1985 Revised Statutes of Canada, ch. P-4, § 44 (1985).
226. 1970 Revised Statutes of Canada, ch. P-4, § 46 (1970).
227. 107 N.R. 198 (1990).
228. See id. at para. 7.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at para. 18.
232. Id. at para. 7.
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include anything less than an actual sale as infringement.233
Whether this case remains good law is questionable, however,
because the court was interpreting the prior patent statute. The
present law has no "vending" provision.234 Regardless, it does
demonstrate that the Canadian perspective on the exclusive
rights of a patent are more in line with that of the Federal
Circuit.235
Reference to the international standards of other countries
does not shed conclusive light on what should constitute an
offer. Canada and the United Kingdom seem to have differing
perspectives on the law. In the United Kingdom,
commercialization in a broader sense, such as advertising, is
sufficient for infringement.236 While the Canadian courts have
not directly addressed the issue of infringement by an offer to
sell, they seem to have taken a narrower approach, requiring
formal commercial offers. 237 The United Kingdom's analysis,
however, should be afforded more weight in determining the
appropriate legal standard in the United States because the
United Kingdom court explicitly addressed infringement for
"offers to dispose," which corresponds to the United States'
"offers to sell" provision. Consequently, international
considerations suggest a broader interpretation of what
constitutes an infringing offer than the strict requirement for a
formal commercial offer, the current standard articulated by the
Federal Circuit.
D. An Economic Analysis of "Offers to Sell"-Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime
In addition to consideration of the "on-sale bar" and
international provisions analogous to "offers to sell," another
important consideration in assessing the proper scope of "offer
to sell" infringement is the pecuniary impact on a patentee if
another party makes an unauthorized offer to sell without
actually completing the sale. This subpart evaluates the
economic considerations of "offer to sell" infringement, a topic
which has been overlooked by the courts and pertinent
literature.
233. See id. at para. 18.
234. See 1985 Revised Statutes of Canada, ch. P-4, § 44 (1985).
235. See id.
236. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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1. Assessing the Economic Consequences of an Infringing
"Offer to Sell"
What is the real harm to the patentee if someone makes a
competing offer to sell, but does not actually complete the sale?
At first glance, there seems to be no harm-if there is no sale, then
the patentee has not lost anything. The Federal Circuit,
however, has described "offer to sell" infringement as a "real
act[ ] with actual consequences... [that] subject[s] a defendant
to full liability under the law." 238 The purpose of this form of
infringement is to prevent an infringer from "generating interest
in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of
the rightful patentee." 239 The Federal Circuit unfortunately has
yet to explain in economic terms what would be the commercial
detriment. Other courts seem to believe that there is little actual
harm from a mere offer to sell.240 At present, none of the
academic literature has addressed this issue, so this article will
attempt to correct this omission.
In evaluating the economic impact of an infringing offer to
sell on a patentee, this subpart considers three scenarios: (1) an
inventor not practicing the invention and not competing 241 in the
relevant market; (2) an inventor competing in a market with
available non-infringing substitutes; and (3) an inventor
competing in a market without available non-infringing
substitutes.
238. Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Rader, J., concurring).
239. 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
240. See, e.g., American Bio Med. Corp. v. Peninsula Drug Analysis, Co., No.
CIV.A. 99-218-SLR, 1999 WL 615175, at *4 n. 6 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 1999) ("Given the fact
that liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) can now rest on mere 'offers to sell,' the court
is reluctant to require proof of actual sales and is not sure what other 'tangible
effect' is contemplated."). This issue has also arisen in the context of insurance,
with the insured party arguing that "offer to sell" infringement is an "advertising"
injury covered by a given insurance policy. See, e.g., Everett Assoc., Inc. v.
Transcontinental Ins. Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d. 874, 884 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("Defendant
Transcontinental also argues that there could be no duty to defend because the only
available remedy for 'offer to sell' infringement is an injunction .. "); Quantum
Group, Inc. v. American Sensor, Inc., No. 96 C 0761, 1998 WL 171837, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
April 10, 1998) ("Specifically, Klesman contends that there is no basis on which
damages could be calculated against it under theories of lost profits or reasonably
royalties.").
241. A patentee could compete either by selling the item directly or through
licensees. Licensees of the patentee are considered effectively agents of the patentee
for this analysis.
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a. Patentees Not Utilizing the Invention
In the first scenario, the patent holder is exercising the right
to exclude by prohibiting use of the invention while not
practicing the invention herself. The patentee is not actually in
the market for the patented or similar goods. For the non-
practicing inventor, harms from offers to sell are de minimus.
Because she is not in the market, the inventor has not lost sales
to a competing infringer. Moreover, the patentee has incurred
no marketing expenses, no start up costs, or other transaction
costs to enter the market. The only expenses incurred are from
the development of the invention and the cost of procuring the
patent. Yet, notwithstanding the absence of true economic harm
to the patent holder in this scenario, she will be entitled to a
reasonable royalty, which is the floor for patent infringement
damages.242
The non-utilizing inventor likely will receive a low royalty
rate for damages. The reasonable royalty calculus is rather
complicated, 243 but one of the numerous factors included are
other royalties paid to the inventor or in the market,244 which
242. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2003) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer ... "). See also Robert S. Frank, Jr. and Denise W. DeFranco, Patent
Infringement Damages: A Brief Summary, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 281, 281 (2000) ("Therefore,
even where the patentee has not shown any harm caused by the infringement, thepatentee is still entitled to the award of a reasonable royalty."); John W. Bagby,
Business Method Patent Proliferation: Convergence of Transactional Analytics and
Technical Scientifics, 56 BUS. LAW. 423, 454-55 (2000); Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent
Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145, 156 (1998).
Affording an exclusive right over mere offers to sell may indirectly benefit
the non-utilizing patentee if the patentee intends to eventually license the patent.Persons offering an infringing invention presumably would engage in some sort of
advertising or other marketing to locate potential consumers. Once the patentee
locates the infringer through such marketing activities, the inventor would have the
ability to enjoin the alleged sale prior to its completion, unlike under prior law-
when the sale had to be complete for there to be infringement. The earlier
availability of injunctive relief may allow the inventor to obtain the license more
quickly than under the pre-TRIPS statute. While the non-utilizing patentee may notincur any true harm from an offer to sell the invention, such infringement may
afford lower transaction costs in locating potential licensees, to the benefit of the
inventor and to the public because the invention will now be utilized.
243. See Georgia Pac. Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (identifying fifteen different factors that might be considered
in a reasonable royalty, "hypothetical negotiation" analysis).
244. See id.; Rahman, supra note 242, at 156. ("Courts are likely to use established
royalties, when they exist, as the best measure of compensation for the injured
party.").
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may be the "best measure of a reasonable royalty." 245 This factor
does not exist in the context of a non-utilizing inventor because
there have been no licenses. Absent this factor in the reasonable
royalty analysis, a court would find a low reasonable royalty.
Because the harm to the patentee is de minimis, however, even
this award could be viewed as a windfall to the patentee. As
such, although the harm to non-practicing infringers is
negligible, the award of reasonable royalty damages and the
possible signaling effect of such infringing offers provide a
pecuniary reward to the inventor.
b. Patentees in Markets Without Non-Infringing
Substitutes
If a patent holder enters a market with no non-infringing
substitutes for the patented good, then she possesses the only
rights to the good in the market and is the sole source of the
good.246 Traditionally, the patentee would be awarded lost
profits as damages in this situation.247 With "offer to sell"
infringement, however, there are no lost profits-no sale was
completed, so the patentee did not lose a sale to the infringer.
What, then, is the harm to the patentee from the infringing offer
for sale?
The answer is price erosion. The patentee may be forced to
lower prices to compete due to the infringer's entry into the
market. 248 Price erosion has long been recognized as a type of
patent infringement damage. In Yale Lock Manufacturing Co. v.
245. See Frank, supra note 242, at 291.
246. See Harold R. Brown, Proof of Lost Profits Damages Following Rite-Hite v.
Kelley, 23 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N Q.J. 577, 594 (1995) ("The purpose behind
showing no acceptable, non-infringing alternatives is to establish that there is, in
effect, a two-supplier market consisting of the patent owner and the infringer
(because other infringers are excluded from consideration) so that the patent owner
would probably have made the infringer's sales but for the infringement.").
247. To be awarded lost profits, the patentee generally must prove (1) demand
for the patented product; (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3)
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount
of the profits the patentee would have made. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros.
Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). The patentee is entitled to lost
profits for the lost sales of not only goods covered by the patent but also goods not
covered by the patent that compete in the same market. See Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
248. See Ramsey Shehadeh and Marion B. Stewart, An Economic Approach to the
"Balance of Hardships" and "Public Interest" Tests for Preliminary Injunction Motions in
Patent Infringement Cases, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 341, 346 (2001);
Rahman, supra note 242, at 156.
20031
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Sargent249 in 1886, the Supreme Court recognized this potential
consequence:
[The district court] confined [the] award [of damages] to the
enforced reduction of price on the locks which the plaintiff
sold, caused by the infringement. That this is a proper item
of damages, if proved, is clear. It is a pecuniary injury
caused by the infringement, and is the subject of an award of
damages, although the defendant may have made no profits
and the plaintiff may have had no established license fee.250
The Yale Court dealt with price reductions due to competition
via actual sales by an infringer, not simply offers to sell.251
An offer to sell alone, however, could cause price erosion.
A patent may provide the patentee with market power sufficient
to allow the patentee to charge a price higher than the
competitive price, 252 particularly if there are not any non-
infringing substitutes that compete with the patentee's product
are on the market. Forced price reduction can occur before the
infringer has made a sale, for example, by simply announcing
future market entry.253 A patentee may also have to forgo any
future price increase due to the infringer's entry into the market,
which would also be a compensable form of price erosion.254 A
completed sale, however, would not be required for the
depressive effect on price to occur.
The Federal Circuit, unknowingly foreshadowing the
change in the law to include "offers to sell" as infringement,
recognized that price erosion may occur before a sale is
completed. A patentee may be injured prior to an infringing
sale: "[w]here the infringer announces a future product and the
announcement actually affects the patentee's profits prior to the
first sale of the infringing product, the patentee may be entitled
to recover for those lost sales." 255 In Brooktree Corporation v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,25 6 the patent holder argued that the
infringer's mere announcement that it would enter the semi-
conductor chip market at a lower price forced a price
249. 117 U.S. 536 (1886).
250. Id. at 552.
251. See id. at 551-52.
252. See Shehadeh and Stewart, supra note 252, at 346.
253. Brown, supra note 246, at 609-10.
254. See Frank, supra note 242, at 287-88.
255. See id. at 288.
256. 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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reduction. 2 7 The infringer objected to the award of damages for
any price erosion that occurred before any infringing sales were
made because the sales themselves did not cause the earlier
price reduction. 258 The Federal Circuit rejected the infringer's
contention, noting that the key factor in damages is but-for
causation-"losses incurred upon announcement by [the infringer]
of the infringing activity may be included, when the losses are
found to be reasonably related to the infringing activity." 259 The
Federal Circuit, therefore, allowed an award of price erosion
damages based on pre-sale activity. 260
Prior to the amendment of the patent laws to include
infringement for offers to sell, recovery for pre-sale price erosion
was contingent upon a subsequently completed sale, even
though the patentee was pecuniarily harmed by the mere
announcement of entry into the market by a competitor. In
Brooktree, if the infringer had never completed any sales, the
patentee would not have been able to recover the damages for
price erosion because there never would have been an act of
infringement. 261 Infringement for offers to sell an invention
eliminates this discrepancy in the patent law by affording
recovery for this harm in the absence of a completed sale.
Price erosion claims may become more frequent in patent
litigation. Although price erosion claims should be "endemic" to
patent litigation 262 and damage awards for price erosion should
be fairly routine,263 its attractiveness to patentees under the prior
257. See id. at 1578.
258. See id.
259. Id. at 1579 (emphasis added). The court concluded that there was a
sufficient nexus between the pre-sale marketing activities and the infringing sales
by stating:
We conclude that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis in the
record from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that
Brooktree's price reductions were made as a result of AMD's actual and
announced marketing of the infringing chips, and, accordingly included
these price reductions in the calculation of damages.
Id. at 1580-81.
260. See id. at 1580-81.
261. Cf. id. at 1578 ("AMD argues that it was improper to permit the jury to
decide whether the Brooktree price reductions were 'a result of the infringement',
and that the district court should have held as a matter of law that Brooktree's price
reductions, made before there were infringing sales, should not be included.").
262. See Roy J. Epstein, State Industries and Economics: Rethinking Patent
Infringement Damages, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 367, 368 (2000).
263. See Gregory J. Werden et al., Quantity Accretion: Mirror Image of Price Erosion
from Patent Infringement, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 479, 480 (1999).
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law was lessened because price erosion mitigates lost profits.
The reasoning is simple-if the patentee charged a higher price,
then the quantity demanded for the good would be less. 264 In
other words, the total units sold in the market would be less,
and there would not be a one-for-one correlation between the
sales of the infringer and the lost sales of the patentee.265 The
lost profits awarded to the infringer would have to be reduced
to reflect the decreased quantity of goods that would have been
sold.266 As such, formerly it was "conceptually difficult for a
plaintiff to pursue lost profits on lost sales and a price erosion
theory in the same case." 267 The competing effect of price
erosion on lost profits may explain the conspicuous absence of
claims for price erosion damages. 268
The mitigating effect of price erosion vis-A-vis lost profits,
however, is not present in assessing infringement liability based
solely upon an offer to sell.269 No sale has been completed, and
the infringer could not have "stolen" a sale by the patentee. The
only harm to the patentee would be the reduction in the
patentee's price. Patentees, therefore, could assert claims for
price erosion in the absence of a completed sale. Consequently,
the attractiveness of price erosion as a form of damages may
increase in the future, hopefully eliminating the dearth of legal
discourse on this subject.270 The use of price erosion damages
may remain infrequent, however, because of the availability of
injunctive relief. The patentee can seek an injunction of the offer
264. See id. at 480 ("[A] lower price necessarily implies a higher quantity, other
things being equal, so a necessary consequence of price erosion is 'quantity
accretion."); Christopher S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits
Damages, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 747, 759 (1994) ("In analyzing a claim of price erosion, a court
should consider that a patentee who raises prices in the absence of infringement
will almost certainly experience a decrease in demand for the patented product.").
265. See Frank, supra note 242, at 288; Shehadeh and Stewart, supra note 248, at
348 (noting that quantity demanded in competitive market would differ from a
duopoly or monopolistic market).
266. See Frank, supra note 242, at 288; Bagby, supra note 242, at 455.
267. Frank, supra note 242, at 288.
268. See Epstein, supra note 262, at 368. Also, while price erosion should occur
fairly routinely in patent cases, the extent of erosion may be so slight that patentees
may reasonably decide not to pursue recovery. See Werden et al., supra note 263, at
482. The extent of price erosion is largely dependent on the elasticity of demand for
the patented product, with more elastic demand creating more price erosion. See
Marchese, supra note 264, at 759-60.
269. See supra notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
270. See Epstein, supra note 262, at 368 (noting that "[f]ew legal analyses even




itself, precluding both the completion of the sale and the
necessity for the patentee to lower prices.271 In this scenario,
price erosion damages clearly would not be available and the
patentee would be limited to a reasonable royalty for the
infringing offer to sell.272
c. Patentees in Markets with Non-infringing Substitutes
Price erosion poses a real pecuniary harm to a patentee in a
market without acceptable non-infringing substitutes. In
contrast to the previous subsection, this subsection evaluates the
impact of infringing offers to sell in a market that has
alternatives not covered by the patent.
The basic assumption for requiring that no non-infringing
substitutes exist in evaluating a claim for lost profits is that, if
there are substitutes, then it is not certain that the patentee
would have made the sales absent the infringer. The customer
may have purchased a substitute from someone else instead of
the patentee's product. For purely "offer to sell" infringement,
there is no issue of whether a sale was lost because no sale was
completed. 273
271. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2003) ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases
under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court
deems reasonable.").
272. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2003).
273. A possible harm could be a "bait and switch" technique, in which an
infringer offers to sell an embodiment of the invention, then switches to a lower
priced, non-infringing substitute later. See Natare Corp. v. Aquatic Renovation
Sys., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d. 986, 990-91 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Corp.,
44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1792, 1795-96 (W.D. Wis. 1997). To make such a switch, however,
there necessarily is available a non-infringing substitute, which should be reflected
in the market price, i.e., there should be a competitive market. Cf. Grain Processing
Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[An
acceptable substitute not on the market during the infringement may nonetheless
become part of the lost profits calculus and therefore limit or preclude those
damages."); Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Colo. Sept.
14, 2001) (finding non-infringing substitutes when the infringer switched to a non-
infringing machine after an infringement determination). The patentee in theory
has lost a sale due to the infringing offer, while what eventually is sold would not
infringe. See id.
It would seem odd, however, to first offer the infringing device or process
only to later substitute a non-infringing device or process that is cheaper after
supposedly winning the contract. The more logical approach would be to offer the
non-infringing substitute first in order to bid at a lower price. Thus, the bait-and-
switch risk seems low. The one exception may be if the offer was prior to the
issuance of the patent. Upon discovering that the process or device infringes, the
infringer would then change to a non-infringing substitute. Infringement as an
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The relevant concern, however, is the effect of price erosion.
As the previous subsection explained, if the patentee holds
market power and there is sufficient price elasticity, then the
effects of price erosion can be significant. 274 With available non-
infringing substitutes, the market power of the patentee is
reduced. Price erosion in this scenario will likely be de minimis
because the act of one offer to sell will not be sufficient to
suppress the market price. Conceivably there could be some
reduction in market price if the market is not truly competitive
or more closely resembles a duopoly, but price erosion in a
market with non-infringing substitutes would be slight.
In this context, then, the pecuniary harm to the patentee
seems to be minimal, just as it was for the situation in which the
"offer to sell" under this scenario, however, has been rejected. See Beloit, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1796. Instead of viewing this situation as infringing, the court
characterized it as laudable "designing around." Id. at 1796. As the offer preceded
issuance, that initial offer could not be viewed as infringing. See id.
Another potential problem with a bidding-type process is if the bid contains
technical specifications that only the patented device satisfies. Thus, everyone
submitting a bid would be infringing. Seemingly, this could greatly expand the risk
of infringement to all potential bidders. An interesting question would be whether
courts would enforce this form of infringement if the patentee had in some way
coerced or convinced the biddee to adopt the patented device as the specification.
See Natare Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d. at 986.
In this case, Natare's actions would have led to the infringement of its own
patent because it induced a potential buyer to require other bidders
unfamiliar with the patent to unwittingly offer to install a pool liner using
the patented method. Natare's practice of persuading entities to use its
specification in their bid solicitations in effect prevents anyone except
Natare or its licensees from bidding on the entities' projects. We caution
Natare that courts will not allow a patent holder to misuse its patent by
expanding its monopoly rights beyond the lawful scope.
Id. at 993-94. It would seem questionable whether this is in fact an inappropriate
expansion of the monopoly rights-the patent covers the process for which parties
were bidding. The court suggested that equitable defenses-such as equitable
estoppel, laches, or an implied license-may prevent a party in this situation from
obtaining relief, see id. at 994, but it is unclear whether any of these doctrines would
actually limit liability in this context. Laches arises when there is an unreasonable
delay in bringing suit, which may or may not be the case. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). Equitable
estoppel is concerned with representations made by the patentee that she does not
intend to sue an infringer, upon which the infringer detrimentally relies. See id. at
1028. No such representations may be made by the patentee, which would
preclude the use of the defense. It also is not clear, aside from the arguably unclean
hands of the patentee, why a license should be implied by the bidding process. See
id.
274. See Epstein, supra note 265, at 368; Marchese, supra note 267, at 759-60;
Werden et al., supra note 263, at 482.
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patentee was not practicing the invention.275 Just as in the "non-
practicing" scenario, the proper damage award is a reasonable
royalty. 276 Unlike the situation in which the patentee is not
competing in the market, here the patentee is engaged in
commercial activity and may have licensed the patent. If so,
then the reasonable royalty calculus would be facilitated by the
actual royalties paid to the patentee by others. 277 The reasonable
royalty, however, would provide overcompensation because
there is no true pecuniary harm from a mere offer to sell. As
such, the patentee is in effect getting a windfall for his patent.
2. Implications of the Economic Analysis of Infringement
through Offers to Sell
The above analysis shows that there is potential and
significant pecuniary harm to patentees when a competitor
offers to sell an invention, regardless of whether that sale is
actually completed. Claims for price erosion damage may
become more frequent over time, particularly for the period
between the offer for sale and the actual sale, if it occurs. This
harm, however, arises only in the situation in which the patentee
has sufficient market power to set the price above the
competitive level. In the context of the non-practicing patentee
or in a market with non-infringing substitutes, the effects of
price erosion will be greatly reduced, if not eliminated entirely.
This analysis has significant implications for the appropriate
standard for an "offer" under § 271(a). Limiting this form of
infringement to formal "commercial offers" does not adequately
protect a patentee from price erosion. A competitor can put
downward pressure on market price by simply threatening to
enter the market or through a significant advertising campaign.
Aside from market pressure, the presence of another competitor
in the market also can eliminate information gaps between the
customers and the patentee-gaps that the patentee may want to
preserve in order to charge a higher price. A formal commercial
offer is not required for a depressive effect on price. In order to
275. One potential injury is the cost of advertising, an issue that has arisen in the
context of insurance litigation. See, e.g., Title Homedics, Inc. v. Valley Gorge Ins.
Co., No. SA CV 99-928 DOC (AN., 1999 WL 33301457, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1999);
Everett Assocs., Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881-84 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
276. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 243.
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effectively close the loophole in the patent laws identified by the
Federal Circuit in Brooktree,278 limiting offers to sell to strictly
commercial offers is inappropriate. That definition is
underinclusive-it does not include the entire class of activity
that will harm the patentee through price erosion, such as a
competitor merely advertising or announcing its intent to enter
the market.
E. Conclusion: "Offer" Should Be Broadly Construed for Both
Infringement and Invalidity
The above analysis is a mixed bag with regards to the
proper standard for an "offer" under § 271(a) and § 102(b). This
section analyzes the pros and cons of an expansive versus a
narrow interpretation of both § 271(a) and § 102(b), as well as
any possible benefit to treating the two provisions the same,
regardless of the standard adopted.
1. "Offers to Sell"-Expansive vs. Narrow Treatment
The first question is whether "offers to sell" under § 271(a)
should be interpreted to require a formal commercial offer or
merely a more general form of "commercialization" that would
include activity such as advertisements. Because "offer to sell"
was added to § 271 to harmonize United States law with
international standards, 279 interpreting that statutory provision
consistent with the international norms is appropriate.
Although the Canadian law suggests the use of the narrower,
"formal commercial offer" definition,280 the more appropriate
analogy is the United Kingdom's interpretation of "offers to
dispose," which is broad enough to cover more than just formal
commercial offers.281 This approach also would appropriately
tailor the scope of infringing activity to the harm involved-
preventing price erosion. Price erosion can result from
competitor activity that falls short of a formal commercial
offer.282 An expansive view of "offers to sell" would more
appropriately protect the patentee's interests. Finally, an
expansive view of "offer to sell" infringement would be
consistent with Congress' apparent interest in expanding the
278. See supra notes 255-68 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 80-81and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 225-33 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 211-24 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 246-72 and accompanying text.
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scope of patent protection, as demonstrated by its numerous
additions to the exclusive rights provided by § 271.283
Arguments for a narrow, formal commercial offer can also
be made. The narrower interpretation is arguably consistent
with the statutory language requiring an "offer," in contrast to
the broader "on sale" language of § 102(b). A narrow
interpretation of infringement would avoid the potential chilling
effect that a broad definition might have on competitors'
attempts at designing around the patent. Narrowly tailoring
this new form of infringement would also be consistent with the
courts' historical antipathy towards patents, although arguably
this antipathy is antiquated and contrary to Congress' interest in
expanding the scope of patent protection.
2. On-Sale Bar-Expansive vs. Narrow Treatment.
Given the intricate relationship between § 271(a) and
§ 102(b), consideration of the appropriate "on-sale bar" standard
is warranted. Interpreting § 102(b) expansively under the RCA
approach properly reflects that the "on-sale bar" is a prior art
provision. 2 4 The focus should be on what was in the public
domain, as opposed to the exact nature of the transaction
between the two parties. The broader definition of § 102(b)
would also provide greater notice to prospective patent
applicants so that they know when to file. The Federal Circuit
contends that requiring "commercial offers" promotes certainty
under the "on-sale bar," 285 but this conclusion is illusory. The
legal standard for what constitutes a "commercial offer" is
ambiguous, and a technologist likely would be unable to discern
at what point her commercialization has become a formal
offer. 286 Little is gained with the adoption of a requirement for a
formal commercial offer to sell in order to invalidate a patent.
3. Should the Standard for These Provisions Be the Same?
Another consideration in evaluating the proper standard for
the "on-sale bar" and "offer to sell" infringement standards is
the potential interaction between them. Regardless of the
standard adopted, there may be benefits to treating the
provisions similarly-or differently-that merit discussion.
283. See supra notes 33-81 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 152-53, 188-208 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
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Making the two doctrines identical can simplify patent law
to a certain extent. Under this model, the development of the
"on-sale bar" and offer to sell infringement can develop in
parallel and inform each other. In this way, practitioners could
rely on the evolution of these two doctrines to help understand
both, particularly if the development of one is slower than the
other. Treating the two identically also would lessen any
diversity and add certainty to the patent laws.
Treating the two doctrines as coextensive, however, ignores
the apparent difference in the statutory language of §§ 271 and
102(b). The two provisions are not identical, suggesting they
should be interpreted differently. The "on sale" language is
broader than "offer to sell." From the perspective of statutory
construction, treating the provisions differently may be
appropriate.
4. Adopting a Broad "Commercialization" Standard for Both
§ 2 71(a) and § 102(b) Is Most Appropriate
Although there is no perfect answer to what the appropriate
standards should be under § 102(b)'s "on-sale bar" and § 271(a)'s
infringement for offers to sell, all of the various considerations
most strongly suggest that the two provisions should be
interpreted identically and should require something less than a
formal commercial offer. Any attempt to commercialize the
invention more than one year prior to filing a patent application
would invalidate the relevant patent claims, and any
commercialization during the patent term by a non-patentee
would be infringing. In this manner, the two doctrines can
evolve side-by-side. United States law would remain
harmonized with that of the rest of the world,287 and patentees
would be adequately protected against potential price erosion
from competitors improperly entering the market.288  The
negatives of this approach are rather minimal in contrast to the
gains afforded, merely implicating interpretive canons that
should be trumped in the presence of strong countervailing
policy considerations. Such is the case here -the need for
harmonization and for affording protection to the patentee
commensurate with inflicted harm are serious policy
considerations that counsel against adhering blindly to rules of
287. See supra notes 211-37 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 246-72 and accompanying text.
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statutory interpretation. Similarly, under this standard,
§ 102(b)'s role as a prior art provision would be preserved, and
inventors would have greater certainty as to when a patent
application must be filed, if the Federal Circuit afforded a
broader "commercialization" definition to the "on-sale bar."
IV. How COMPLETE MUST THE INVENTION BE TO FIND
INFRINGEMENT?-INFRINGEMENT AS APPROPRIATION
Having concluded that an "offer" under § 271(a)-and
§ 102(b)-should be broadly interpreted as covering attempts to
commercialize the invention, this section addresses the other
side of the infringement equation. The patent must cover what
is offered for sale. In the context of offers to sell, however, the
question as to how one should make this assessment remains. In
the past, the law required a physical embodiment of the
invention for there to be infringement, making the comparison
of the device to the claims rather direct. In the context of an
offer, however, the question whether the infringing device must
be in complete, physical form, or whether diagrams will suffice
remains.
A. Judicial Interpretation of§ 271(a) Requires the Physical
Embodiment of an Invention for Infringement
The Federal Circuit has tried to define the metes and
bounds of § 271, in assessing how complete an invention must
be for there to be infringement. In analyzing this issue, the
Federal Circuit has assailed the continued viability of Deepsouth
Packing, Co. v. Laitram.289  Specifically, in Paper Converting
Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,290 the accused infringer had
never assembled an infringing device, nor did it ever sell a
completely assembled device.291 Instead, the accused infringer
sequentially tested various parts of the "rewind" machine at
issue, but never all the parts at once.292 The accused infringer
then shipped the unassembled device to the customer with
instructions not to construct the machine until two days after the
patent expired. 293
Notwithstanding that a completely assembled device had
289. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
290. 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
291. See id. at 14-15.
292. See id. at 15.
293. See id. at 15.
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never been created during the patent term, the Federal Circuit
concluded that these acts constituted infringement under
§ 271(a).294 The Federal Circuit limited Deepsouth to the issue of
extraterritoriality295 and held that only an "operable assembly" is
required for infringement:
It does seem as if the concept of an "operable assembly" put
forward by Justice White in his majority opinion [in
Deepsouth] is probably something short of a full and complete
assembly; thus, if the infringer makes an "operable assembly"
of the components of the patented invention, sufficient for
testing, it need not be the same thing as the complete and
entire invention. 296
The court concluded that the acts of the accused infringer
constituted infringement:
Where, as here, significant, unpatented assemblies of
elements are tested during the patent term, enabling the
infringer to deliver the patented combination in parts to the
buyer, without testing the entire combination together as was
the infringer's usual practice, testing the assemblies can be
held to be in essence testing the patented combination and,
hence, infringement.297
The Federal Circuit thereby attempted to limit the scope of
Deepsouth and its language regarding what constitutes direct
infringement.
This effort by the Federal Circuit, however, was short lived.
Subsequently, courts have considered Paper Converting to be a
narrow exception to the general rule that "until a device covered
by a patent is actually assembled, the device has not been
'manufactured."' 298 The Federal Circuit itself has shied away
from the broad statements in Paper Converting, either
294. See id. at 19-20.
295. See id. at 17 ("Although in Deepsouth the Court at times used broad
language in reaching its decision, it is clear that Deepsouth was intended to be
narrowly construed as applicable only to the issue of the extraterritorial effect of the
American patent law."). But see Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 26 (Nies, J., dissenting
in part) (dissenting vigorously from the view that Deepsouth was not controlling
and indicating that "[tihe majority opinion is no less than a reversal of Deepsouth").
296. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
297. Id. at 19-20.
298. Graffenried v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 209, 214 (1992). See also Conner
Peripherals, Inc. v. Western Digital Corp., No. C-93-20117-RMW-EAI, 1993 WL
645932, at *12 (noting that the narrow purpose of Paper Converting was to preserve
the patent term).
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distinguishing it on narrow grounds 299 or noting that Deepsouth
remains the controlling authority on § 271(a). 300  A device
therefore must be in a completed, physical state in order to
infringe a patent.
The Federal Circuit has yet to address the specific issue of
whether a physical embodiment is required for offers to sell a
patented invention. Nor has the court articulated a standard for
actual, completed sales. With respect to actual sales, the district
courts have had to decide cases without significant guidance
from the Federal Circuit. 301 The lower courts have generally
concluded that an infringing sale requires delivery of the item-
and therefore a physical embodiment-for the sale to be
complete.302 This approach is consistent with the common law
definition of "sale," which required delivery. 30 3 No cases have
reached a contrary result, although one court has questioned the
continued viability of this line of cases in light of the addition of
"offers to sell" to § 271(a).304
299. See Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775-76 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(concluding that Paper Converting is inapplicable to method claims).
300. See Murphy, supra note 66.
301. See Technical Mfg. Corp. v. Integrated Dynamics Eng'g, 183 F. Supp. 2d.
339, 344 (D. Mass. 2002)
Given the lack of dispositive precedent on the issue, the prudent course is
to engage in specific factfinding to determine when the IDE/DPR contract
became enforceable and when the contemplated system was installed, and
to resolve the question of whether a sale was completed, for purposes of 35
U.S.C. § 271(a), on the basis of the full transactional picture that emerges.
Id.
302. See Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d.
613, 621 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("The negotiation and execution of a contract to sell is not,
standing alone, a sale that is an act of infringement under section 271(a) and (g).
The cases also require performance."); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys.,
C.A. Nos. 91-48/91-515-SLR (Consolidated), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21547, at *15-*18
(D. Del. Nov. 10, 1994) ("Here, defendant Allied-Signal actually entered into sales
contracts for such a product. Allied-Signal has not, however, delivered any Multi-
Tour brakes to any purchaser.... For the purposes of Section 271(a), a 'sale' is not
complete until the infringing product is actually delivered to a purchaser.");
Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng'g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Conn. 1979)
("[Iln order for there to have been a sale within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a),
the entire apparatus must have been constructed and ready for use. Until the
apparatus is constructed and ready for use, it cannot be clear whether infringement
has taken place.").
303. See Ecodyne, 491 F. Supp. at 197. See also Leavitt, supra note 54, at 1916-18
(noting that common law and the UCC generally require delivery for a sale).
304. See Technical Mfg., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 342-43 ("Compounding the conceptual
difficulty is the fact that both Joy Technologies and Ecodyne arose during an earlier
period when United States patent law did not include liability for offers to sell
infringing products....").
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The Federal Circuit also has yet to establish a standard for
infringing offers to sell. Some commentators have suggested
that a tangible embodiment would be required for there to be
infringement for an offer to sell.305 In contrast, the Federal
Circuit has intimated that a physical embodiment is not
necessary. The court in 3D Systems only required "a description
of the allegedly infringing merchandise and the price at which it
can be purchased." 306 The court has never indicated that the
device must be in some sort of physical form. The extent to
which 3D Systems is controlling is uncertain, however, because
the Federal Circuit only addressed personal jurisdiction in the
case and not the actual merits of the infringement claim.307
A second case also suggests that a physical embodiment
may not be required. In Shockley v. Arcan, Inc.,308 the issue was
the defense of intervening rights. 09 The court rejected a defense
of absolute intervening rights, which requires a "tangible
article" B0 regardless of whether there was an infringing offer to
sell because there was no such tangible item.311 In that case,
although an infringing offer to sell may have been made prior to
the reissuance of the patent, the accused devices were not
manufactured prior to the date of reissuance, precluding
absolute intervening rights.312 By recognizing that the infringer
could have infringed by offering to sell devices before they were
manufactured, however, the court implicitly suggested that
manufacturing of the infringing device is not a necessary
precursor to infringement.313 Again, however, the court did not
squarely address this issue, so this opinion merely offers insight
and not binding precedent. The case does suggest that the court
is heading in the direction of not requiring a physical
embodiment for infringement by an offer to sell, which would be
a dramatic departure from precedent.
305. Irving and Lewis, supra note 1919, at 352 ("As under the former law, it
appears that actual production of the completed infringing article is required under
the new infringement provisions.").
306. See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
307. See id.
308. 248 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
309. See id. See also supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
310. See Shockley, 248 F.3d at 1360.





B. A Bifurcated Approach to Infringement-Eliminating the
Requirement for a Physical Embodiment of the Invention for
"Offers to Sell" and "Sales"
At present, case law suggests that a physical embodiment is
required for there to be infringement under the three original
forms of infringement listed in § 271(a)-making, using, or
selling.314  The Federal Circuit has suggested that such a
requirement may not apply to infringing offers to sell the
patented invention, but has yet to articulate a definitive
standard.315 The addition of this new form of infringement
creates an opportunity to reconsider how complete an invention
must be for there to be infringement.
Infringement should be viewed as an appropriation of the
patented invention. When infringement occurs, a third party is
taking the invention from the patentee in some form without
compensating her.316 The nature of the appropriation varies
according to the infringing act. In the context of offers to sell the
invention and actual sales of the invention, the appropriation is
commercial. In this context, the infringer has utilized the
invention for commercial gain without compensating the
patentee. In the context of "making," "using," or "importing"
the invention, however, the appropriation is physical use of the
invention without compensation. To properly analyze
infringement as appropriation, the courts should take a
bifurcated approach, analyzing offers to sell and sales distinctly
from the infringement analysis for making, using, or importing
the invention.
1. Infringement via Offers to Sell or Sales Should Require Only
an Enabling Disclosure-More Lessons from the "On-Sale
Bar"
a. Appropriation of the Invention Can Occur via Offers to
Sell and Actual Sales Prior to Creation of a Physical
314. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
315. See supra notes305-13 and accompanying text.
316. Cf. Ned A. Israelsen, Making, Using, and Selling Without Infringing: An
Examination of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 457, 476 (1989) ("Accordingly, it is
suggested that making, using, or selling under the infringement statute should be
considered to occur only if the invention is practice primarily to secure the benefits




Offering to sell a product does not always require that the
embodiment of the invention be in physical form. For example,
a party may agree to sell an item before it is made, such as
purchasing a condominium before construction. Moreover, for
many devices, offers are made via specifications and
requirements prior to constructing any device particularly in
situations in which the device is complicated and expensive to
construct without the assurance of purchase.317 The economic
analysis of the offer to sell form of infringement previously
discussed supports the proposition that courts should consider
an offer to sell infringing, even if there is no physical
embodiment of the device. The primary pecuniary harm to the
patentee in this context is price erosion. The erosion occurs
when the competitor enters the market with advertising
activities; thus price erosion is not necessarily contingent on the
competitor having the device in hand.318
Similarly, selling an invention should not require a physical
embodiment, despite the holding in Deepsouth.319 Under the
current interpretation of Deepsouth, which requires a physical
embodiment, "sale" has been subsumed into the "making"
language of § 271, an interpretation that is disfavored as a matter
of statutory construction.3 0 Moreover, the Deepsouth approach
317. The same would be true for contributory infringement by an offer to sell. A
person could design the part that has no non-infringing use and sell it prior to
building it, thus satisfying the requirement for contributory infringement. See 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) (2003). In fact, for a non-staple item, a party likely would only have
designs; if it has no non-infringing use, there likely is no market for the component
in the absence of the particular contract. The producer will not make the invention
or component until it has a contract to sell in hand.
318.
Potential infringers could offer to sell their products nationwide, and
remain immune from suit in many forums simply by arguing that the
accused product was not in current inventory stock, or that they had not
yet inked a supply contract for the last bold needed to make the accused
product. This high-level generation of commercial interest culminating in
all but a final sale of the accused product would contravene the
established purposes of amending § 271(a) to include offers to sell.
Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2002 WL 31443128, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
30, 2002).
319. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram, 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972).
320. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Newman, J., concurring) ("A statute is construed ... in a manner that does
not render any of its provisions superfluous, contradictory, or illogical."). See also
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988) ("[W]e
are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders
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is outdated. Some devices may be so complex that the sale of the
invention might take place over time and not in an "instant,"
such as for a large plant321 or a satellite.322 It would seem that the
economic appropriation of the invention via a "sale" could be
realized well before actual creation of the good, suggesting that
the adherence to the requirement of a physical embodiment for a
finding of infringement is now antiquated. Interpreting a "sale"
as infringing before there is a completed device gives
independent meaning to "sale" under § 271. Courts therefore
should interpret § 271(a) to include sales where the device has
not actually been completed. 323
The strict reading of what constitutes infringement as
pronounced by the Supreme Court is admittedly rooted in the
historical antipathy towards patents (and the supposed
monopoly afforded thereunder) by the courts.324 This view
seems inappropriate in modern times. As the economic analysis
in Part III.D. demonstrates, mere possession of a patent does not
ensure a monopoly in a given market.325 Monopoly power
instead depends on the availability of competitive substitutes for
the patented good. Congress has recognized that possession of a
patent does not per se guarantee monopoly power in any given
market.326
Consequently, the Supreme Court's antipathy towards
superfluous another portion of that same law.").
321. See, e.g., Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting
that the patented method required an entire plant and thus "[tlhis is not a case
involving assembly line production and sale of a machine designed to practice a
patented method which a purchaser can be expected to put to immediate use.").
322. See, e.g., Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. C 96-3418 SI,
1999 WL 1278382, at *1-*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1999), rev'd 271 F.3d 1076 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (discussing, for on-sale bar purposes, the development of the patented
satellite technology over time).
323. Accord Leavitt, supra note 54, at 1929 (rejecting UCC definition requiring
delivery and concluding "[tihe best indicia of when 'selling' has already occurred is
the formation of a binding contract requiring delivery of the goods.").
324. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 530.
325. See supra notes 238-77 and accompanying text.
326. See generally Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust
Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 196-200 (1989). Congress added 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(5) to allow a patentee to condition the sale of a patented good on the
requirement that the purchaser buy a separate product, "unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned." See id.
Congress accordingly allows tying arrangements where the patentee lacks market
power, recognizing that a patent does not grant a per se monopoly.
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patents based on its bias against monopolies 327 is unfounded.
The doctrine of narrowly construing the patent statutes with
respect to infringement, therefore, warrants reconsideration.
Congress has a different perspective, as demonstrated by its
continuing expansion of the exclusive rights provided in § 271.328
In an age of computer design and modeling, requiring that an
actual embodiment be sold or offered for sale is antiquated.329
Affording patent protection for sales in which a device has
not been made could create problems. For instance, until there
is delivery, whether the device or good sold infringes is
uncertain because the seller could change the item to make it
non-infringing. 330 This concern is minimal and its reasoning is
circular-changing the device after the contract is formed is only
"non-infringing" if the infringing activity requires a physical
embodiment. If a physical embodiment is not required, then
there already has been infringement. Moreover, the concerns
raised by this issue can be properly addressed through the
remedy in a given case. For example, for an "offer to sell," the
primary harm would be price erosion, but this harm only arises
if there are no non-infringing substitutes for the patented
good.331 To be able to deviate from the contract specification
would require the existence of non-infringing substitutes. As
noted above, the harm to the patentee in the presence of non-
infringing substitutes would then be de minimis: a court would
issue an injunction, but the infringer could simply shift to a non-
infringing alternative. Similarly, in the case of a sale, if there are
non-infringing substitutes, the infringer could make the
substitution, and the harm would be de minimis to the patentee;
she would still be entitled to an injunction, but the court could
327. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
329. Cf. Holbrook, supra note 139, at 971-72 ("Computer-assisted design software
permits extensive and complicated modeling of carious apparatuses, processes and
combinations. It would indeed seem bizarre in this modern setting to require that
every invention, regardless of the nature of the technology involved in the
invention, be physically constructed before it would be considered patentable.").
330. See, e.g., Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("Further, it is possible that in the interim between contracting for the construction
of a plant and actually building the new plant, a new development will lead to a
change in design and Flakt will never actually build a plant capable of performing
the patented process."); Ecodyne, 491 F. Supp. at 197 ("[D]efendant may breach its
contract and produce something entirely different or nothing at all. In that event,
infringement will never have taken place.").
331. See supra notes 246-70 and accompanying text.
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allow the switch if equity so warrants. 332 Regardless, in a market
with non-infringing substitutes, the infringer simply should
have offered a non-infringing substitute.
b. Requiring an Enabling Disclosure for Infringement-
Incorporation of the "Ready for Patenting Test" from the
"On-Sale Bar" Doctrine
The reality that an invention can be economically
appropriated before the creation of a physical embodiment
warrants reconsideration of infringement for offers to sell and
actual sales. Infringement still requires the claims to read on the
infringing device. There still must be some metric against which
infringement is measured in the absence of the physical object
itself. The "on-sale bar" offers some guidance and an
appropriate standard for measuring infringement without a
physical embodiment.
The Supreme Court has recognized the reality that an
invention can "exist" before it is physically constructed in the
context of the "on-sale bar" of § 102(b). 333 For the "on-sale bar"
to apply, two conditions must be met: there must be a
commercial offer for sale and the invention must be ready for
patenting.334 The second condition is relevant in assessing the
proper standard for "paper infringement" under § 271(a) for a
sale or an offer to sell.
To prove that an invention is "ready for patenting" under
the "on-sale bar," an accused infringer must demonstrate that,
before the critical date, either the invention was reduced to
practice 335 or that the inventor had prepared drawings or other
descriptions of the invention that were sufficient to enable a
person skilled in the relevant technological field to practice the
invention. 336 The Court thus recognized, in the "on-sale bar"
context, that requiring a physical embodiment was not necessary
332. The patentee in either of these scenarios would be entitled to a reasonable
royalty under § 284. See Bagby, supra note 242; Frank, supra note 242; Rahan, supra
note 242. The reasonable royalty referred to here would be practically nothing,
however, given that there has been no real use of the invention if there has simply
been an offer to sell or a sales contract without delivery.
333. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
334. See id.
335. Reduction to practice requires a physical embodiment of the invention. See
supra note 144 and accompanying text.
336. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68.
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for there to have been an "invention" under § 102(b).337
The analogies to "offer to sell" infringement become clear.
If an embodiment of an invention can be considered "on sale,"
i.e., offered for sale, in the context of § 102(b) when it exists only
on paper, there is no reason that an embodiment of an invention
should not be considered as having been "offered for sale"
under § 271(a).338 One of the policy concerns of the "on-sale
bar," allowing a patentee effectively to extend the term of the
patent by commercially exploiting the patent pre-term, is
identical to the commercial benefit gained by a would-be
infringer by offering to sell the invention. That which the
patentee cannot do before the critical date, an infringer should
not be able to do during the patent term.
Similarly, there is no reason to distinguish between offers to
sell and actual sales. Given the requirement of § 271(i) that an
"offer to sell" is only infringing if the contemplated sale will
occur during the patent term, 339 defining when there is a "sale"
of the patent becomes crucial. The important harm is the
economic appropriation of the invention. The invention in
either context can be appropriated even if the device has yet to
be constructed. Accordingly, infringement via actual sales
should be treated in the same fashion as offers to sell, and any
requirement for an embodiment of the device should be
rejected. 340
Given the clear analogies to "on-sale bar" law, the Federal
Circuit should use that law in evaluating whether there has been
infringement via an offer to sell or a sale of an invention.
Further, the court should require an enabling disclosure-
337. See id.
338. See 5 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16 .02[5][g], at 29 (Cumulative Supp. 2001)
("One can transfer this test [i.e., the Pfaff test] directly to 'offer to sell."').
339. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2003) ("As used in this section, an 'offer for sale' or an
'offer to sell' by a person other than the patentee, or any designee of the patentee, is
that in which the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of the patent.").
The statute offers no definition of "sale." See id. at § 271.
340. Admittedly, this change in the law could afford patentees significant
benefits towards the end of the patent term. See Leavitt, supra note 54, at 1904-05("As a result, patent holders lose profits from sales that otherwise would accrue to
them near the end of the patent life."). In conjunction with "offer to sell," if the
offer is accepted, completing the sale, but no delivery is scheduled until after the
patent expiration, there would be infringement under the approached articulated in
this article. In the past, such activities would not have constituted infringement,
and the patentee would have lost compensation for an appropriation of her
invention that took place during the patent term.
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diagrams and evidence surrounding the offer that would allow
one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1-for there to be infringement via offers to
sell or actual sales.
The present "operable assembly" standard of Paper
Converting has added an element of uncertainty to this area of
the law. The definition of "operable assembly" as "something
short of a full and complete assembly" 341 seems strikingly
similar to the standard formerly applied by the Federal Circuit
for the "on-sale bar"-the "substantially complete" standard.342
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pfaff, the Federal Circuit
required that an invention be "substantially completed ... with
reason to expect that it would work for its intended purpose
upon completion." 343 Like the "operable assembly" language of
Paper Converting, an invention could be considered "on sale" for
purposes of the statutory bar of § 102(b) even if the invention
was not reduced to practice.344 So long as there was a fair
amount of confidence that it would work, ie., by testing various
unassembled components, then the bar would apply. The
Supreme Court criticized this standard as "seriously
undermin[ing] the interest in certainty." 345 The same argument
can be made with respect to the "operable assembly" standard
of Paper Converting-it would be difficult for infringers and
patentees alike to ascertain when a device should be considered
"complete enough" to constitute infringement.346 Adoption of
an enablement standard would add more precision to this
inquiry. If the disassembled components were in a state so as to
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to construct the invention
readily, perhaps if accompanied by assembly instructions, then
there should be infringement. By requiring an enabling
disclosure of the accused device, courts should be able to assess
341. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 18
(Fed. Cir. 1984).




345. See Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1998).
346. See Stuart Watt, Patent Infringement: Redefining the 'Making' Standard to
Include Partial Assemblies: Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,
745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 60 WASH. L. REv. 889, 908 (1985) ("Paper Converting's
standard is uncertain and leads to a more subjective test for judging infringing
activity. Substantial manufacture requires a guess by the court that the object as
assembled will infringe in final form.").
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whether the limitations of the claims at issue have been literally
satisfied.
A potential problem of finding infringement without a
physical embodiment arises in the context of the doctrine of
equivalents. A patent can be infringed even when the
limitations of the patent's claims are not met exactly. When the
infringing item is not identical to what is claimed, but is only
insubstantially different, the device is said to infringe under the
doctrine of equivalents.347 It would be a challenge to assess
whether a difference is substantial or not based on a paper
record. On its face, the analogy between offers for sale to the
"on-sale bar" seems to break down.
The "on-sale bar" applies not only in the context in which
what is offered for sale is exactly what is claimed in the patent; it
also applies if what is offered for sale renders the claimed
invention obvious, through the conjunctive use of §§ 102(b) and
103.348 In order to obtain a patent, an invention cannot be
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the relevant technological
field.349 Even if what is claimed in the patent is not identical to
what is in the public domain, the inventor cannot obtain a patent
on the invention if it is a trivial or simple advance over the
current state of the art. This doctrine applies to the "on-sale bar"
as well, which precludes patentability "if one of ordinary skill in
the technological area, looking at what was offered for sale,
would readily come up with the claimed invention." 350
One could approach infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents by drawing a comparison to the use of obviousness
in the "on-sale bar." If the change made to the device accused of
347. See, e.g., Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1016 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). A simplistic way of thinking of the doctrine of equivalents is that,
although the accused device is not identical to what is claimed in the patent, the
variation between the device and the claim limitations are "close enough" for the
court to view the device as infringing. See id. One way to assess whether the
difference between the patent claim and the allegedly infringing device is
insubstantial is to assess whether the element in the accused device component
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to yield
substantially the same result as the claim limitation. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997).
348. See, e.g., Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mach., Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). Obviousness is a standard for patentability defined by 35 U.S.C. § 103.
A person cannot obtain a patent on a device that would be obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant technological field. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003).
349. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003).
350. Holbrook, supra note 139, at 938.
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infringing would be viewed as "obvious," then it would be
considered an insubstantial difference, infringing under the
doctrine of equivalents. This analogy between obviousness and
the doctrine of equivalents has been drawn in the past.351 It is
undisputed, however, that the obviousness test and the test for
equivalency are separate and distinct.35 2 This factor is not really
a problem, however, because the traditional equivalency
analysis could be applied. If the disclosure is enabling, then
there should be sufficient information to determine how the
accused device works, and whether any given element of the
allegedly infringing device performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to yield substantially the
same result as the relevant claim limitation. 35 3 Accordingly, an
assessment of infringement in the context of "paper
infringement" should not be difficult if infringement requires an
enabling disclosure.354
2. "Making," "Using," or "Importing" an Invention Under
§ 2 71(a) Should Require a Complete Physical Embodiment
In contrast to the situation of "offers to sell" and "actual
sales," infringement for "making," "using," or "importing" an
invention under § 271(a) should retain the requirement for a
physical embodiment of the patented invention. The plain
meaning of the words suggest that, as a matter of statutory
construction, there needs to be a tangible form of the device.355
351. See Roston Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Nies, J., additional views) ("A substitution in a patented invention cannot be both
nonobvious and insubstantial. I would apply nonobviousness as the test for the
'insubstantial change' requirement of Hilton Davis.").
352. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1191 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) ("The grant of a separate patent on the accused device does not
automatically avoid infringement, either literal or by equivalency.").
353. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40
(1997).
354. See Holbrook, supra note 139, at 967-74 (arguing that the enablement
standard of § 112, 1 should be used for the on-sale bar analysis). The
incorporation of enablement into the on-sale bar has subsequently been adopted by
the courts. See Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 271 F.3d 1076,
1080 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[Wlhen development and verification are needed in order to
prepare a patent application that complies with § 112, the invention is not yet ready
for patenting."). The enabling standard for infringement would be the same as
§ 112, 1 as well.
355. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003). Whether that device needs to be completely
assembled is a different question. See infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text
(arguing that infringement should be determined by an enablement standard and
not be a "completeness" standard).
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"Making" would mean to create the invention in physical form.
Webster's Dictionary defines "to make" as "to cause to exist,
occur, or appear" or "to put together from components." 356 "To
use" the invention also suggests that the invention exists in
physical form. Webster's Dictionary defines "to use" as "the act
or practice of employing something." 357 "To employ" the device
also suggest that there be a physical embodiment of the
invention.
"Importing" is a recent addition to the law.35 8 Generally, a
complete embodiment should be required for the invention to be
appropriated in this context as well. "Importation" of a design
should not constitute infringement because no pecuniary loss
has occurred. The importation harm accrues only if there is an
embodiment of the invention. Moreover, the importation of
unassembled parts should not constitute infringement, as the
device has yet to be appropriated. If the parts are later
assembled in the United States, then there would be
infringement for making the device. If the importation is
pursuant to a sale in the United States, then there would be an
infringing sale subject to the proposed enablement standard.
Importation of the invention, therefore, should require a
complete embodiment; other possible variations would be
covered by the other infringement provisions.
In order to infringe by "making," "using," or "importing"
the patented device, a physical embodiment should still be
required. Only in this sense could there be an appropriation of
the invention. The creation of enabling diagrams does not mean
that the infringer has made, used, or imported the invention
because nothing of the inventor's has been appropriated. To the
contrary, finding an infringing use absent a physical
embodiment would undermine another important policy
component of the patent system-designing around patents.359 A
competitor would be greatly inhibited from designing around a
patent if the mere generation of design diagrams could
constitute infringement for "making," "using," or "importing."
356. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 688 (1981).
357. Id. at 1279.
358. The language regarding imports was added at the same time as "offer to
sell." See URAA, supra note 2, at 4815.
359. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("We have
often noted that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incentive it provides
for 'designing around' patented inventions, thus creating new innovations.").
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How else could the competitor evaluate the invention and
potential alternatives?360 Given the nature of the terms "make,"
"use," and "import" and significant design-around
considerations, the concept of appropriating the invention
through these forms of infringement necessarily requires a
physical embodiment of the invention for a finding of
infringement. Otherwise the uncertainty that attends the odd
standard of Paper Converting would persist.
C. Examples in Which the Patent Law is Already Diverging from the
Strict Deepsouth Requirement of a Physical Embodiment
The departure from requiring a tangible embodiment of a
device in order for there to be infringement for an offer to sell a
sale may seem radical to some. As a practical matter, proving
infringement in court would be difficult. Infringement would
amount to "paper" infringement or a mere comparison of the
patent claims to a writing or diagram rather than an actual
device. The reality is, however, that the patent system already
has examples of infringement in which the completed
embodiment has yet to be created.361 As a result, it is clear that
our patent system could handle this new approach to
infringement.
1. ANDA Litigation
Paper infringement already exists in U.S. patent law, in
pharmaceutical litigation over abbreviated new drug
applications (ANDAs) filed with the FDA by generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers. 362 To promote a more complete
understanding of this process, this subpart offers a brief
overview of this extremely complicated statutory mechanism.
360. In the context of pharmaceuticals, one commentator has suggested that
computer-aided designs should constitute infringement even if the drug has never
been physically made or used, existing only in cyberspace. See Ted L. Field,
Computer-Aided Drug Design Using Patented Compounds: Infringement in Cyberspace?,
34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1001, 1019-23 (2001). This approach gives little weight to the
significance that designing around plays in our patent system by fostering even
greater innovation. See id. The risk of chilling such design around strongly
counsels against allowing the "make" or "use" standard to include non-physical
embodiments because competitors would have no ability to weigh the technical
merits of the invention, even by making a mere drawing on a napkin. See id.
361. See infra notes 362-87 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
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As a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984,363 patent
holders can sue competing drug companies for infringement
prior to actual sales or offers to sell the patented drug.364 A
generic drug company that wants to manufacture and market a
generic version of a drug that the FDA has already approved
may do so by submitting an ANDA to the FDA instead of
having to file a complete, exhaustive new drug application.3 65
Often brand-name manufacturers have patents on a given drug.
If any of these patents have yet to expire, the generic company
must certify either that it will not enter the market until the
patents expire or that the relevant patent is invalid,
unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the generic company's
drug.366 If the generic manufacturer certifies that the patent is
invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed, then the generic
manufacturer must notify the patentee as such.367 The patent
owner then has forty-five days to sue for patent infringement
based on the filing of the ANDA.368 Even though there has been
no marketing or selling of the drug, merely filing an ANDA
constitutes infringement and provides a jurisdictional basis for
bringing suit.369
The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he function of the
paragraphs in question is to define a new (and somewhat
artificial) act of infringement for a very limited and technical
purpose that relates only to certain drug applications." 370 One
can easily see why the act of infringement is filing a form with
the FDA. The infringement analysis becomes somewhat difficult
because "a specific infringing composition has not yet been
made, used or sold, and is thus not necessarily available for a
363. S. 1538, 98th Cong. (1984), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. This Act is
formally part of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, but is generally known at the Hatch-Waxman Act. See id. See also Glaxo, Inc.
v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); supra note 58-61 and
accompanying text.
364. See id.
365. See Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1568.
366. See id. at 1568-69. The Hatch-Waxman Act requires the patent holders to
file these patents with the FDA. They are listed in what has come to be known as
the "Orange Book." See id. By consulting the Orange Book, generic manufacturers
have notice of what patents cover the approved drug. See id.
367. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)-(3) (2003).
368. See Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1569. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (noting that mere
filing of an application is an act of infringement).
369. See Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1569.
370. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990).
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court to compare to the claims." 371 There is accordingly a
"future aspect"372 to these cases because the supposed infringing
drug has yet to be produced. The court must determine
"whether, if the drug were approved based upon the ANDA, the
manufacture, use, or sale of that drug would infringe the patent
in the conventional sense." 373  The materials that can be
considered include the ANDA itself and the materials that are
submitted to the FDA in support of the ANDA. 374 Generally, the
contents of the ANDA, mere paper filings, are sufficient for the
infringement analysis. 375 As the Federal Circuit has noted,
"[b]ecause drug manufacturers are bound by strict statutory
provisions to sell only those products that comport with the
ANDA's description of the drug, an ANDA specification
defining a proposed generic drug in a manner that directly
addresses the issue of infringement will control the inquiry." 376
The similarities between ANDA litigation and infringement
for offers to sell and actual sales are apparent. The assessment of
whether the accused device infringes would be based on either
the papers surrounding the sale or the offer to sell. The courts
can readily deal with this "paper infringement" in the context of
ANDA litigation. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that they
would be unable to do so in the case of a sale or an offer to sell
infringement analysis under § 271(a). The test proposed here
would cabin any possible concern about the state of
development of an infringing device by requiring that these
disclosures be enabling to one of ordinary skill in the art. If
someone of ordinary skill in the technological field could read
the information regarding the device that has been offered for
sale or has been sold and could readily build the device, then it
would be sufficient for a finding of infringement.
2. Infringement Under § 271(0 (2)
The Federal Circuit also has adopted a standard that does
not require the complete physical embodiment of the invention
in order to find infringement in its interpretation of § 271(f). As




375. Abbott Labs. v. Torpharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing




previously discussed, § 271(f) was added to the patent statute to
overrule part of Deepsouth. 377 A party is liable for infringement
under § 271(f)(2) if it supplies a part of an invention that is
"specially made" for the invention and is not "a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use." 378 The component must be "uncombined in whole or in
part," and the accused infringer must know that the device is
specially made and "intend[ ] that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that would
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the
United States." 379 The question that arose from the addition of
§ 271(f) was whether the device actually had to be assembled
outside of the United States in order for there to be
infringement.3 0 If the components were simply sent overseas
but never assembled during the patent term, would there be
liability for infringement?
In Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 3 81 the Federal
Circuit answered this question in the affirmative in which the
accused infringer had sent components overseas to be assembled
into an allegedly infringing device.382 Once the suit was filed,
however, the accused infringer ceased all work on the project
and never built a working, infringing system.383 Although the
court recognized that "infringement without a completed
infringing embodiment is not the norm in patent law," the court
nevertheless rejected the argument that the lack of assembly
precluded liability for infringement.384 All that is necessary
under § 271(f) is the intent to make the combination, regardless
of whether the components are ever actually assembled. 38 5 The
court compared this scenario to that of offers to sell under
§ 271(a) in that "shipping components of an invention abroad
without combining them is no more an attempt than offering to
377. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
378. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2003). The requirement for a substantial non-
infringing use is simple. See id. If the component has another use, then there is no
reason to presume that it will be used in a device abroad if that device were
assembled in the United States. See id.
379. Id.
380. See infra notes 381-87 and accompanying text.
381. 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
382. See id. at 1365.
383. See id.
384. Id. at 1368-69.
385. See id. at 1368.
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sell an invention without actually selling it."386 The court
allowed for infringement even though the completed machine
had not been assembled.387
The implications for the expansion of patent infringement
articulated in this article are clear. Waymark allowed liability for
the export of parts of an infringing device, regardless of whether
the device was assembled and arguably regardless of whether
the other parts needed to assemble the machine had actually
been manufactured. 388  Waymark is a vast departure from
Deepsouth, which focused on the requirement of assembly of a
device for which all of the components had been manufactured.389
Waymark is more akin to Paper Converting, but it does differ
significantly. All of the components of the machine in Paper
Converting had been created, but had yet to be assembled.390
Under Waymark, there could be infringement without the
remaining components having been manufactured. 391 Under
this reasoning, the court could allow infringement for a device
that does not physically exist in its entirety in either assembled
or unassembled form.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit has shown a willingness
to expand infringement analysis beyond the traditional limits,
which required the existence of an operable embodiment. In
light of this willingness, the new standard articulated in this
article is not nearly as radical as it may appear on its face. Thus,
the court system should be able to assess infringement for a sale
386. Id. As part of its reasoning, the Federal Circuit feared that requiring
overseas assemblage would "pose the appearance of 'giving extraterritorial effect to
United States patent protection."' Id. (quoting Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 17). This
assertion is erroneous. By not requiring assembly, the court has now broadened the
category of behavior that is viewed as infringing, providing even more
extraterritorial consequences as a result of U.S. patent law. See Beckner, supra note
19, at 832 ("Nevertheless, the U.S. patent is infringed on a mere showing that the
alleged infringer shipped components and had knowledge of the patent. Thus,
Waymark's 'no assembly required' rule effectively extends the extraterritorial reach
of the U.S. patent law beyond U.S. territorial limits."). There may be infringement
even if the components are assembled after the patent expires or if they are never
assembled.
387. Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368. The appeal was from a summary judgment of
non-infringement, so the court remanded the case for further consideration of the
infringement question in light of the proper construction of § 271(f). See id. at 1369.
388. See id. at 1368-69.
389. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972).
390. See Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11,
19-20 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
391. See Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368-69.
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or offer to sell a device based on an enabling disclosure of the
device.
D. Conclusions as to the Proper Scope of Infringement Under
§ 271(a)
The addition of infringement for offers to sell a patented
invention merits the reconsideration of the present standards of
infringement. In viewing infringement as appropriation of the
invention, "making," "using," or "importing" the invention still
contemplates an actual appropriation of the invention itself, and
therefore requiring a complete physical embodiment of a device
is appropriate. The severe chilling effect that could attend
expanding infringement for making or using the invention to
include a mere enabling disclosure strongly warrants against
changing the standard.
The situation for offers to sell and sales is different. The
appropriation of the invention for these forms of infringement is
the economic value of the invention. Economic harm can accrue
before the invention is in a physically completed form.392 Price
erosion potentially could occur before the device is built,
particularly in a bidding context in which the contract is for
construction of the device. Sales can also remove value from the
patent before there is a tangible embodiment of the invention.
Requiring an enabling disclosure for infringement would better
protect the economic value of the patent for the patentee. The
Federal Circuit has suggested that an embodiment will not be
required for offers to sell,393 and there is no reason that actual
sales should be treated differently. Given the expansive view of
infringement by Congress, as shown by the continual expansion
of exclusive rights under § 271, and the already demonstrated
ability of courts to deal with infringement in the absence of a
tangible embodiment, as shown by ANDA litigation and the
interpretation afforded § 271(f)(2), little fear should attend in
making this step.
V. CONCLUSION
The amendment of § 271(a) to include "offers to sell" a
patented device as a form of infringement occurred with little
392. See supra notes 246-72 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
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heralding.394  This article corrects some of the legislative
oversights from that amendment and demonstrates that the
impact of this new form of infringement could be extremely
significant. The opportunity for parties to claim price erosion as
a form of damages has the potential to alleviate the dearth of
case law and literature on the subject. In order to protect the
patentee adequately, this form of infringement should cover a
wide variety of commercial activities and not just formal
commercial offers.395 This form of infringement also provides
the opportunity to re-think perspectives on infringement. There
is no reason to continue to adhere to the antiquated notion that
therecan be infringement only when there is a physical
embodiment of the patented device.
The lessons learned from the analysis of the "offer to sell"
have implications well beyond this provision itself. Its
juxtaposition to the "on-sale bar" sheds light on the fact that, as
presently interpreted, the "on-sale bar" doctrine is erroneous. A
standard of general commercialization, instead of requiring a
formal commercial offer, would better effectuate the policies
underlying both doctrines. From the perspective of "offers to
sell" under § 271(a), the broader interpretation would ensure
that United States laws are harmonized with the international
community396 and that the scope of infringement is sufficient to
redress the economic harm inflicted upon the patentee by the
infringing offer. 397  For the "on-sale bar," predictability for
inventors would be enhanced by the use of the RCA
commercialization standard instead of the present requirement
of a commercial offer. 398
Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, the analysis of "offer
to sell" infringement via an infringing good should eliminate the
vestiges of requiring tangible, working embodiments of an
invention for there to be infringement through commercial
appropriation of an invention. So long as there is an enabling
disclosure surrounding the offer to sell or the actual sale of the
invention, then the proper infringement analysis can be
performed. 399 The law has already stepped significantly away
394. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 209-37, 287 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 246-72, 288 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 317-54 and accompanying text.
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from the aging standard articulated in Deepsouth, as evidenced
by ANDA litigation and the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
§ 271(f)(2).400 Consequently, there is no reason to continue to
adhere to an anachronistic standard predicated on the false
belief that patents afford monopoly power to the patentee and
that belies modern technology. It is time to bring patent
infringement into the modern era.
400. See supra notes 361-91 and accompanying text.
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